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ABSTRACT 
 
 Extant assessments of Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional-anomie theory (1994) 
have generally supported the thesis that, in social collectives where the economy 
dominates, non-economic institutions (i.e. the family, education, polity) are rendered 
feeble, unable to exert their normative controls.  The cultural values of these societies 
places primacy on “making it” (monetary success), while at the same time placing a much 
weaker emphasis on the licit means of achieving these goals.  The resultant state is one of 
anomie, conducive to crime.  Messner and Rosenfeld have extended their argument 
stating that it is not economic dominance per se that contributes to high crime rates, but 
any tip in the institutional balance of power.  The current study examines one of these 
configurations which hypothesizes that, in nation-states where the state dominates other 
institutions, the dominant cultural orientation is one of moral cynicism, conducive to 
corruption-prone behaviors.  Using macro-level data, the current study assesses the 
efficacy of this alternate configuration of institutional-anomie theory as a predictor of 
corruption cross-nationally.  Using a sample of 125 nations, state dominance is positively 
related to corruption.  The effects of the state were both mediated and moderated by 
economic strength, measured as levels of industrialization.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 Over the past two decades, interest has risen sharply in the international 
community on the topic of political corruption and its damaging impact on societies, 
especially those in the developing and transitioning world.  International financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have 
added stipulations making their loans conditional upon the borrower’s adoption of anti-
corruption policy reforms (Brown and Cloke, 2004; Elliott, 1997), and corruption has 
emerged as a global issue in bodies such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), the Organization of American States, and the United Nations 
General Assembly (Fitzsimons, 2002).  Anti-corruption civil society organizations such as 
Transparency International have been calling for greater accountability and transparency 
on the part of nations.  These organizations may look to academic research to guide policy 
and reform, however; the dissemination of empirical corruption studies has, to date, been 
scant.  
 Figure 1 (below) illustrates the pervasiveness of corruption worldwide in 2006.  
Published by Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Worldmap is based 
upon that organization’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which assigns scores to nations 
from 10 (“squeaky clean”) to 1 (“filthy”) based upon published data and expert opinions 
from within and outside each nation.  The United Nations estimates that bribery has 
2 
become a “$1 trillion industry worldwide” (2004).  As illustrated on the Corruption 
Perceptions Worldmap by the red to dark red or wine-colored nations (those whose 
corruption perceptions score is 4.0 or below), corruption is endemic on every continent, 
with the possible exemption of North America and Oceania.  The countries most rife with 
corruption are largely the developing nations of Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, 
as well as the transitional post-Soviet nations of Eastern Europe. 
Figure 1: Corruption Perceptions Worldwide (2006) 
     Reprinted from Corruption Perceptions Worldmap. 
Copyright 2007 Transparency International: The Global  
Coalition Against Corruption.  Used with permission.
1 
 According to a 2002 survey, Transparency International reports that 96% of 
respondents in Pakistan who have had contact with the courts have encountered corrupt 
                                                 
1
  Transparency International (TI) is the global civil society organization leading the fight against 
corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, 
Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and works with partners in 
government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it.  For 
more information, visit http://www.transparency.org. 
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practices (Rodriguez and Ehrichs, 2007).  Susan Rose-Ackerman notes that in Guinea 
continuous demands for bribes are a feature of virtually every business deal, while 
Indonesia’s customs department had become so “ingrown” with corruption that the head 
of that agency signed control of that department over to a private Swiss firm (1997, p. 32).  
Estimates suggest that annually up to five percent of the global economy is lost to 
corruption (Karklins, 2005). 
 What is corruption?  Scholarly researchers and public policy makers have struggled 
with the ambiguity of a definition of corruption and its myriad forms, frequencies, and 
consequences (Johnson and Sharma, 2004).  Definitional issues will be discussed at length 
in Chapter 2.  For the purposes of this study, the succinct definition given by Transparency 
International, the misuse of public power for private gain at the expense of the public 
good, will be used (www.transparency.org).  This definition limits the scope of the study 
to the political realm, yet is broad enough to allow for comparative study across a range of 
nations and cultures. 
 The very nature of corruption makes this crime inherently difficult to study and, 
partially due to this, scholarly research on the topic has been largely underdeveloped.  
While this theoretical and analytical gap has been shrinking in the past decade, 
criminology lags behind disciplines such as political science, economics, anthropology, 
and public administration in its treatment of this problem.  A  possible explanation as to 
why criminologists seem to ignore this phenomenon, aside from the intrinsic sub rosa 
character of corrupt acts, is that criminology in general, and American criminology is 
particular, leans toward the “provincial” (Zimring and Johnson, 2005, f.n. 1).  Radical 
4 
criminologists working in the arena of state and political crime have noted that, from 
2000 to 2005, three of the discipline’s leading journals2 allocated a mere 3% of their 575 
articles to topics involving crimes of the powerful, with only seven of these addressing 
either political or state crime.  The remaining space was devoted to lower class crime 
and/or its control (Lynch and Michalowski, 2006, p. 194).  Although in his 1989 American 
Society of Criminology (ASC) presidential address, William J. Chambliss called for the 
“study of more harmful and insidious forms of crime previously neglected” and “nearly 
all of the works on state crime in the last thirty years have included calls (and sometimes 
a desperate plea) for more criminological attention to illegal actions of states and 
governments,” these topics have remained marginalized in the literature (Kauzlarich, 
Matthews, and Miller, 2001, p. 174).  Definitional disputes and measurement issues 
have in large hindered the study of this phenomenon (Jain, 1998, p. 4).  
 As corruption is an international concern, research pertaining to this 
phenomenon must be comparative.  However, cross-national/comparative criminology, 
including the study of state crime and other crimes of the powerful, has been relegated 
to a small sub-field in orthodox criminology.  Globalization has increased the need for 
scholars to understand their ever-changing world as a whole.  This is not new.  Starting 
as early as 1889, anthropologists sought to construct cross-cultural theory, and, 
beginning in the 1950’s other social sciences including sociology, psychology, and 
political science followed suit (Bennett, 1980).  Criminology must also look to 
                                                 
2
  These include the official publications of the discipline’s two main professional organizations, 
the American Society of Criminology (Criminology) and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (Justice 
Quarterly), as well as the British Journal of Criminology.  
 
5 
comparative study for both theory testing and theory generation, and for the 
“development of an universal criminology” (Karstedt, 2001, p. 288, emphasis in original), 
while avoiding the pitfalls of grand theories that are a-cultural and a-historical (Lynch 
and Groves, 1995; Mills 1959/2000).  Furthermore, cross-national testing of theory 
moves the discipline as a whole from a culturally biased “home-country based 
criminology” (Liu, 2007, p. 4) that is narrow in scope, its theories applicable only to “a 
certain criminal behavior in a particular culture at a particular time” (Bennett, 1980, p. 
253.), toward a more encompassing approach. 
 In addition to adding to the knowledge base, there are practical applications for 
comparative research.  Globalization has made corrupt practices a transnational crime 
much like human trafficking, drug smuggling, industrial and technological espionage, 
and dissemination of child pornography, among others.  Transnational crime, by its very 
nature, requires a coordinated and cooperative response in order to determine best 
practices, analyze how criminal organizations operate, and guide public policy (Bennett 
and Lynch, 1990; Howard, Newman, and Pridemore, 2000, Williams, 1999).  With 
advances in transportation, communication, and other technologies, economic crimes 
such as fraud, money laundering, identity theft, and corruption also extend beyond the 
realm of the political limits of the nation-state (Howard et. al., 2000).  Criminology must 
also broaden its horizons. 
 Similar to other white-collar offenses, (price-fixing, for example), individual acts 
of corruption often victimize persons without their direct knowledge.  Victims also may 
fail to report solicitations for bribes out of necessity or fear, due to threats of extortion.  
6 
At the societal level, indirect violations of human rights and democracy through corrupt 
acts may lack a clear offender and victim, but constitute state crimes against the 
citizenry as a whole, and are thus worthy of criminological investigation (Green and 
Ward, 2004).  Corruption weakens the legitimacy of governments and undermines the 
confidence of citizens.  It also distorts the distribution of benefits, exacerbating existing 
injustices and inequalities; “benefits and advantages are likely to flow to the few and 
the well-connected while costs are extracted from society at large—ultimately, from the 
poor and powerless most of all” (Johnston, 2005, p. 25.  See also Girling, 1997; 
Fitzsimons, 2002; Lynch and Michalowski, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1997).  As Zimring and 
Johnson suggest: 
 corruption is one category of crime where the strong will prey on the weak and 
where the net effect of many acts of corruption may be regressive rather than 
redistributive of income.  In many, if not most, settings where corruption 
flourishes, the offense pattern produces greater rather than lesser 
concentrations of wealth among  advantaged populations.  (2005, p. 798) 
The effects of corrupt practices on the disadvantaged range from further degraded 
living conditions among already impoverished citizens to even death.  Rose-Ackerman 
(1997) cites several case studies that provide examples of the harms caused by 
corruption.  For example, one irrigation district in India indicated that 20-50% of 
government-provided funds were wasted due to corruption and misuse and, in Korea, a 
shoddily-built department store collapsed, killing several people—building inspectors 
had allegedly accepted bribes from substandard contractors (1997, p. 32).  What is 
7 
more, corrupt practices are associated with other criminal activities including drug 
trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and illegal money transfers, the latter of 
which have been suggested to support international terrorist organizations (Gambetta, 
2002; Jain, 1998; Moran, 2001; United Nations, 2004). 
 The current study seeks to add to this small but growing body of literature on 
corruption, a topic worthy of study due to its pervasiveness, global nature, and perhaps 
most importantly, its impact on humanity as a cause of suffering and despair.  As noted 
by Jain (1998), the prevalence and potential harms produced by corrupt acts has, as of 
yet, far exceeded the scholarly that this phenomenon has received.  The current study 
seeks to aid in the remedy of this omission.  The purpose of this research is to transport 
and test an alternate configuration of Messner and Rosenfeld’s Institutional-Anomie 
theory (IAT) of crime, a “particularly apt” theory for cross-national comparative analysis 
(Karstedt, 2001, p. 292).  In contrast to the conventional interpretation of IAT, where 
economic dominance weakens the normative controls of other institutions leading to 
high levels of instrumental crime, here the institutional balance of power is tipped in 
favor of the state, which  predicts high levels of crimes of power such as bribery, 
clientelism, maladministration, and abuses of authority.  Under this configuration, 
rather than a normative breakdown leading to the anomic state, state dominance leads 
to cultural patterns of moral cynicism and withdrawal in the citizenry, which Messner 
and Rosenfeld suggest will enable corruption. 
 This thesis is organized as follows: First, a working definition of corruption will be 
established and correlates and schools of thought discussed.  An overview of the 
8 
findings from extant corruption literature will be provided, with an emphasis on macro-
level, cross-national research.  Chapter 3 provides the theoretical background of 
institutional-anomie theory, a review of literature, and introduces the alternate 
configuration of institutional-anomie to be tested in the current study.  Chapter 4 will 
state the hypotheses to be tested, and provide an in-depth discussion of the data and 
methods used.  Chapter 5 will present univariate (descriptive), bivariate, and 
multivariate results.  An examination of the assumptions of ordinary least-squares will 
be presented, with alternate models proposed as a from of sensitivity analysis.  Chapter 
6 will discuss the findings, acknowledge the limitations of the current study, and present 
calls for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
Corruption 
 What is corruption?  Scholarly researchers and public policy makers have 
struggled with the ambiguity of defining it and its myriad forms, frequencies, and 
consequences (Gambetta, 2002; Johnson and Sharma, 2004, United Nations, 2004).  The 
literature provides multiple definitions, yet none are clear-cut or definitive.  According 
to Johnston, “an irony of corruption is that where it is most important, it can also be 
most difficult to define” (2001, p. 28).  Legalistic, relativistic, and descriptive definitions 
have been suggested, but a clear consensus has yet to be reached.  The concept of 
corruption is still, according to the United Nations, “evolving” (2004). 
The use of legal definitions attempts to provide a universal “objective” standard; 
however, as Brown and Cloke (2004) rejoin, this standard “tends to assume the same 
set of ‘rules’ operate in different political systems and cultural settings and by default it 
is always Western expectations and standards that are presumed universal” (p. 284).  
Rooted in the concept of the rule of law, legal definitions of corruption often go hand in 
hand with moralistic interpretations of an “unsuccessful ‘other’” (Sajó, 2003, p. 173).  
Cultural relativism, however, suggests that these rule and norms are not universal, 
rather a “moving target” approach should be used to situate corruption in the proper 
context (Moran, 2001, p. 380), be it to facilitate a criminalized economy, to “grease the 
wheels” of a fledgling democracy, or as a holdover from a traditional past based upon 
10 
 
norms of kinship (Sajó, 2003, p. 187).  In some countries, rather than corrupt activities 
being proscribed, it is considered a moral duty for a state agent to act for the benefit of 
family and/or friends (Amundsen, 1999).  As Gambetta states, “the notion of what is 
legitimate and legal varies from country to country and time to time, the definition of 
corruption…must vary accordingly, and there cannot be one for all” (2002, p. 34). 
Although corruption may occur in private enterprise, as well as at the 
intersection of the state and corporations where the state initiates or facilitates illegal 
or injurious actions perpetrated by corporations, generally, when we speak of 
corruption, we are concerned with administrative or political malfeasance—that which 
occurs in the public sphere (i.e. governments, the state apparatus).  Nye (1967) supplies 
one of the most popular definitions of public corruption.  In his seminal book Bribes, Nye 
defines corruption as a:  
behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of the 
private-regarding (family, close private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.  
This includes behaviors as bribery (use of rewards to pervert the judgment of a 
person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of 
ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding use) (quoted in Kotkin, 
2002, f.n. 25). 
Robinson (1998) further distinguishes between incidental (individual), 
institutional, and systemic (society-wide) corruption, while Philp (1997) notes that 
11 
 
definitions are mostly centered on public office, public interest, and the market.  
According to Amundsen (1999), corruption is “a particular (and, one could say, 
perverted) state-society relation” (p. 2).   
In order to facilitate comparative research, Johnson and Sharma (2004) suggest 
that researchers define corruption by example.  Few states have laws that expressly 
define a category of illicit acts as political corruption, rather laws are codified that 
condemn crimes such as bribery, extortion, or electoral misconduct (Philp, 1997).  
International bodies such as the United Nations and the International Chamber of 
Commerce have also adopted a descriptive approach, “covering various forms of 
corruption that exist now, but also enabling states to deal with other forms that may 
emerge” (United Nations, 2004).  In line with this descriptive approach, Karklins has 
developed a typology of practices in post-communist nations that illustrates the range 
of activities that fall under the rubric of corrupt acts (see Table 1). 
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Table 1:  Karklins’ typology of post-communist corruption  
Low-level administrative   Bribery of public officials to bend rules 
  Deliberate overregulation, obfuscation, 
  Using licensing and inspection powers for extortion 
Self-serving asset stripping by 
officials 
 Diverting public resources for civil servant spoils 
  Mismanagement and profiteering from public resources 
  Profiteering from privatization 
  Malpractice in public procurement 
  Nepotism, clientalism, and “selling” of jobs 
 
“State capture” by corrupt 
networks 
 De facto takeover of public institutions for private business or 
criminal activity 
  Forming collusive networks  to limit political competition 
  Undermining free elections through slush funds, hidden 
advertising, etc. 
  Misuse of legislative power 
  Corruption of the judicial process 
  Misuse of auditing, investigatory, and oversight powers 
  Using kompromat (propaganda) for political blackmail and 
coercion 
  Corruption of and in the media 
 (Adapted from Karklins, 2002, p. 24) 
  
As illustrated in Karklins’ typography, corrupt practices include those beyond the 
criminal offense of bribery.  In addition to the examples of malfeasance listed, corrupt 
administrations often operate in collusion with other criminal enterprises such as drug 
trafficking, money laundering, organized crime, the underground economy, and illegal 
money transfers (Gambetta, 2002; Jain, 1998; Moran, 2001). 
Although definitional issues are important, they remain unresolved in the 
literature, and lie beyond the scope of the purpose of the current analysis.  For the 
purposes of this research, a conventional, albeit imperfect, core definition of political 
corruption supplied by Transparency International will be used—the exercise of public 
power for private gain (www.transparency.org).  This definition spans the corruption 
continuum described in Karklins’ typology, ranging from low-level administrative acts 
13 
 
such as bribing an officer of the law to rent-seeking (public officials illegally charging for 
services after creating artificial shortages) to kleptocracy (literally, “rule by thieves”) or 
state capture (Johnson and Sharma, 2004; Karklins, 2002; 2005).  The latter may be 
exemplified by cases such as Zaire under Mobutu, the Philippines under Marcos, and 
Nicaragua under Samosa (Jain, 1998, p. 23).  
Compared to the relativistic stance, where corruption is placed within respective 
social contexts, the broad definition adopted in the present study allows for cross-
national comparison across a range of cultures.  What we gain is generalizability, and 
the ability to compare the same behaviors across space and time, even where legalistic 
definitions may prove inapplicable (see Gambetta, 2002, p. 51).  Finally, this definition is 
consistent with the current consensus found in the literature (Goudie and Stasavage, 
1998; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003; 2007a; 2007b; Montinola and Jackman, 
2002; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000; Xin and Rudel, 
2004) as well as with the analytical purpose of the current study. 
Schools of thought and empirical evidence 
 The empirical study of corruption is still in its infancy, with “no body of theory 
ready made for the problem at hand” (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 3).  The definitional 
discrepancies discussed above lead Jain (1998) to observe that “*e+conomists seem not 
to have yet developed a vocabulary, leave [sic.] alone a theory, that can explain the 
wide range of activities that come under the umbrella of corruption” (p. 4).    
Although scholarly research pertaining to this phenomenon exists prior to the 
1990’s (most notably, Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Scott, 1972), a 
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majority of the cross-national, cross-cultural comparative research has appeared only in 
the past two decades.  The bulk of these studies emerged from the disciplines of 
political science, public policy, and economics, and were largely driven by anti-
corruption agendas (Kotkin and Sajó, 2002).  The principal barrier to comparative 
studies of corruption has been measurement problems, such as the lack of valid 
measures across nations (Ades and DiTella, 1999; Husted, 1999; Knack, 2006; Mauro, 
1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Svensson, 2005; Xin and Rudel, 2004), and therefore, large-
n empirical literature is greatly outnumbered by theoretical literature and case studies 
(Husted, 1999; Treisman, 2000).  With the advent of subjective cross-national corruption 
indices, such as those published by Business International (BI), the World Bank Group, 
and Transparency International a number of macro-level studies across nations have 
been made available in recent years. 
 Early theories of corruption assumed that corruption and bribery are universally 
immoral and ethically suspect (Kotkin and Sajó, 2002; Nye, 1967; Sajó, 2003).  Under the 
19th century idea of the rule of law, notions such as “geographical morality” and 
“socially inferior” societies explained the prevalence of corruption in the West’s colonies 
and less developed nations (Kotkin and Sajó, p. 25).  Under a moralistic approach, 
definitions focus on behaviors, certain motive or traits of an agent, (or individual), that 
leads to corrupt acts and practices.  These suspect behaviors may include the 
“degradation of an agent’s ethical sense,” or speak to an individual’s “lack of moral 
integrity, or even to their depravity” (Gambetta, 2002; p. 34).   
By the 1960’s, the anthropological notion of cultural relativism repudiated 
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theories of moral degradation.  Cultural relativist thought explains corruption by societal 
emphases on gift giving, kinship loyalties, and personal ties rather than an adherence to 
the rule of law (Kotkin and Sajó, 2002; Jain, 1998; Montinola and Jackman, 2002).  Based 
upon cultural norms and rooted in the respective social context, what may appear in a 
purely legalistic sense as corruption, can be seen as mere cultural differences rather 
than social harms, making a core definition of the practice impossible.  Few quantitative 
studies include measures of cultural norms, due to the difficultly of obtaining valid and 
reliable measures of culture, especially at the macro level.  Additionally, norm-based 
theories of corruption are often tautological, such that “a country has more corruption 
because its norms are more favorable to corruption” (Bardhan, 1997, p. 1331).  Still, 
several correlates of corruption have appeared in the literature that are consistent, on 
their face, with a cultural relativist school of thought.   
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization -- or the probability that two persons drawn 
from a population at random will not belong to the same group -- has been positively 
related to corruption (Mauro, 1995, Morris, 2004; Shliefer and Vishny, 1993; Treisman, 
2000).  Research indicates that corruption is lower in culturally homogeneous 
populations, as bureaucrats are likely to favor members of their own ethnic group 
(Mauro, 1995, p. 693).  A nation’s dominant religion has also a significant impact on 
corruption levels.  Treisman (2000) found that “hierarchal religions” (Catholicism, 
Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam) present less challenge to office holders, while, in the case of 
Islam, for example, the division between church and state may be blurred (p. 403.  See 
also Paldam, 2001).  Protestantism, on the other hand, with its values of egalitarianism 
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and individualism has been found to reduce corruption by acting as an “autonomous 
civil society” (p. 430).  Treisman suggests that Protestant doctrine instills a distrust in 
state institutions in its congregates, which aids in exposing cases of corrupt behavior 
(2000, p. 421).  Lastly, regional groupings of nations high on corruption rank order 
indices suggest a possible “subculture of corruption”; significantly higher perceptions of 
corruption have been observed in African, Latin American and post-Soviet nations 
(Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Moran, 2001; Xin and Rudel, 2004), although this may 
be confounded by factors such as slow development, bloated states sectors, a history of 
colonization, or other economic or political factors.   
Emerging in part from the cultural relativist viewpoint, the neo-functional 
approach to the study of corruption introduces “efficiency-enhancing” models of 
corruption (Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 148).  Under the neo-functionalist 
theoretical framework, corruption is a functional necessity, as governments, especially 
burgeoning democracies, are unable to provide basic services through legitimate means 
(see Leff, 1964).  Much like the relativist argument, neo-functionalism disputes the 
application of Western norms, ideals, and legal culture to developing and transitional 
societies, suggesting that corrupt behaviors are inevitable by-products of modernization 
(Scott, 1972).  According to this school of thought, corruption is seen as beneficial to 
development by “greasing the wheels of ineffective bureaucracies” (Jain, 1998, p. 26).  
The neo-functionalist models hypothesize that corrupt practices will “facilitate 
development and wane when countries reach a certain level of economic development” 
(Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 148).  Empirical research has refuted this viewpoint.  
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Mauro found that, regardless of “red tape,” corruption deters economic growth by 
lowering the investment rate (1995, p. 695).  Subsequent studies confirm that the net 
effect of corruption on economic development is negative (Mauro, 1998; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Tanzi, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). 
Several studies have examined the relationship between democratization and 
neoliberal free-market principles and corruption.  Public choice theory (and what is 
roughly its micro-level counterpart, principal-agent theory) suggests that corruption will 
be reduced by economic deregulation and by political competition via the election 
process.  Neoliberal policies of market competition (versus government intervention 
and regulation), measured as openness to trade, decreases corruption (Ades and 
DiTella, 1997; 2000; Gerring and Thacker, 2005; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000), while 
policies of “good governance”—accountability, transparency, openness, predictability, 
and rule of law have been linked to a reduction in corrupt activities within social 
collectives (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998).  Transparency, accountability, and a strong 
civil society (such as a free press) further diminish opportunity structures conducive to 
corruption, for example, monopolistic government services (Montinola and Jackman, 
2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999).  The stylized fact that poor nations tend to be more 
corrupt has led to the notion that, as these nations often have large, “cumbersome 
bureaucracies,” government size is related to corruption (Mauro, 1995, p. 706).  In the 
literature, results on this point have been mixed.  Montinola and Jackman (2002) and 
Husted (1999) found that the size of government, measured as the government share of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), actually reduced corruption, while LaPalombara 
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(1994) reports the opposite. 
The relationship between democratization and corruption, the theoretical 
foundation that most informs the current study, has also been mixed in the literature.  
For example, a linear, negative relationship between political democratization and 
corruption has been found (Goldsmith, 1999; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Xin and 
Rudel, 2004), while other researchers have found the inverse (Scott, 1972; Moran, 
2001).  Treisman (2000) found no significant relationship between corruption and 
present democratization, but rather, that the association is dependent upon the length 
of uninterrupted democratic rule, with twenty years being the minimum before any 
significant effect emerges.  These mixed findings may be due to the functional form that 
the democracy-corruption relationship may take.   
Montinola and Jackman (2002), using Bollens’s (1993) measure of political 
democracy—freedom of group opposition, political rights, and legislative effectiveness -
- found that, during the post-1974 third wave of democratization (See Huntington, 
1991), no relationship emerged between democratization and corruption.  Only when a 
non-linear quadratic transformation was applied to the democracy measure did a 
significant association surface.  Sung (2004), on the other hand, suggests that the 
democracy-corruption relationship takes on a cubic form.  As nation-states move 
toward more open, predictable, and transparent policy-making, structured under the 
rule of law, corruption rates drop precipitously, but then appear to resurge.  This may 
indicate a non-recursive relationship, where the causal arrow then flows back from 
corruption to democracy levels, dependent upon initial conditions, as in the case of 
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post-soviet Russia.  Clearly, such findings warrant further investigation of the 
democracy-corruption functional form. 
Additional socio-structural correlates of corruption found in recent literature 
include structural elements of the polity.  For example, larger governments become 
more difficult to manage, providing more opportunity for corrupt acts due to the large 
amounts of impersonal dealings (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Scott, 1972), as do 
federalist states (Goldsmith, 1999; Treisman, 2000).  Natural resource endowments, for 
example the oil-rich Middle Eastern states or ore-rich former Soviet nations, provide 
sources of rents, as these commodities can be sold at a price that greatly exceeds the 
cost of extraction (Ades and DiTella, 1999; Fish, 2005; Fish, 2005; Lambsdorff, 1999; 
Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Mauro, 1997; Robbins, 2000; Treisman, 2000).  Economic 
traits such as overall wealth per capita has been found to decrease corruption 
(Goldsmith, 1999; Xin and Rudel,  2004), while relative and/or absolute deprivation can 
be both a cause and consequence of corrupt administrations (Goudie and Stasavage, 
1998; Lambsdorf, 1999).  Finally, common law systems and a legal culture inherited by 
British colonization (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2000) reduces corruption 
through the emphasis on precedent and procedure. 
It is noteworthy that a bulk of corruption literature appears in the disciplines of 
political science, public policy, and economics.  Although corruption, as a crime of the 
powerful, influences and impedes economic development, weakens public trust and 
undermines political legitimacy, diverts spending designed to help the poor and reduce 
inequality, and erodes social justice (Morris, 2004; Zimring and Johnson, 2005), this 
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subject has been largely ignored by criminologists for theory-testing and theory-
building.  The proposed thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature by testing a general 
theory of crime that, through an alternate articulation, proposes an explanation for 
corruption—Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional-anomie theory.  
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Durkheim 
 Anomie theories assume conformity, that human beings are “basically social and 
compliant…under normal conditions,” (Paternoster and Bachman, 2001, p. 141, 
emphasis in original).  In motivational theories such as anomie, we must account for rule 
breaking.  The anomic paradigm in criminology can trace its theoretical roots to the 
work of French sociologist Emile Durkheim.  Durkheim first introduced the concept of 
anomie, which typically refers to a societal condition where social norms are unclear or 
non-existent, in his doctoral dissertation The Division of Labor in Society (hereafter 
Division).  In Division, Durkheim suggested that anomie was due to an “abnormal” form 
of the division of labor, brought about by the progression from the mechanical solidarity 
of simple societies to the more complex organic solidarity common in industrialized 
societies (1984, p. 301).   
 In simple societies, collective moral beliefs (generally centered on religion) yield 
a strong “conscience collective” that limits individual actions (Giddens, 1979, p. 30).  As 
societies become more complex, labor becomes specialized and differences between 
individuals become more apparent.  Rules, regulations, and “*s+olidarity among 
functionally differentiated parts must ultimately depend on mutual consensus 
concerning operating procedures” (Olsen, 1965, p. 39).  According to Durkheim, an 
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anomic state occurs if “this regulatory process either does not exist or is not related to 
the degree of development of the division of labor” (1984, p. 303).  Conditions of the 
abnormal, or “forced” division of labor include inequality, “class-wars,” crime, and 
“meaningless, routinized, and degrading” social functions (Willis, 1982, p. 107-108).  
 There is a large body of literature, including critiques, empirical evaluations, and 
extensions and elaborations of Durkheim’s division of labor thesis; five are briefly 
reviewed here.  Two represent a general overview of cross-national findings based upon 
two different interpretations of Durkheim’s formulation.  The other three take 
advantage of the natural experiment that is the Russian Federation.    
 Krohn (1978) examined Durkheim’s perspective at the cross-national level (N = 
33) using population and urbanization measures to capture the moral density of a 
society and energy consumption as a proxy for industrialization.  A division of labor 
measure developed by Gibbs and Martin (1962) captured the evenness of the 
distribution of individuals into various industrial categories; greater diversification 
indicated greater interdependence in a given society.  Lastly, anomie was 
operationalized using Feierabend and Feierabend’s measure of systematic frustration—
computed by subtracting the sum of the mean standard score of the following  four 
variables: gross national product per capita (GDP) and the number of radios, 
newspapers, and telephones per capita, from the national literacy rate.  Krohn’s initial 
model failed to support Durkheim’s thesis; however, when the (admittedly weak) 
anomie variable was removed, bivariate analysis showed an expected, moderate, and 
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positive relationship between population, moral density, a diversified division of labor, 
and both property and total crime rates across nations (1978, p. 665-666). 
 Messner (1982) argued that development will have no effect on homicide rates 
cross-nationally, as “societal development is usually accompanied by structural changes 
of an egalitarian nature which permit the bonds of organic solidarity to form” (p. 228).  
Messner’s model as a whole explains about 28% of the variance in homicide rates, with 
equality (measured as 1-Gini coefficient of income inequality) inversely related to 
homicide rates, consistent with the hypothesis that egalitarian trends promote organic 
solidarity.  However, population has the opposite effect suggesting that rapid 
population growth may be “inherently destabilizing” in and of itself (p. 236).   
 Recent research has been able to take advantage of a unique natural 
experiment--the events that have occurred in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, to test hypotheses derived from Durkheim’s social deregulation thesis.  Kim and 
Pridemore (2005a) found that rapid socio-economic change increased homicide rates 
across 78 sub-national Russian regions (out of a total of 89 regions).  Additionally, their 
research indicates that rapid political change (measured as the vote for opposition 
parties versus ballots for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia—parties that called for a return “to something resembling 
Communist or Soviet Rule;” (Pridemore and Kim, 2005b, p. 88) exerts a strong, positive 
influence on the change in post-1991 property crime rates.  This relationship holds after 
controlling for socioeconomic indicators.  The researchers interpret these findings as 
indicative of a short-term threat to Durkheim’s notion of “collective sentiments:”  
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[I]t is fair to argue that long-standing Russian cultural traditions included strong 
bonds based on collective sentiments, and the Soviet era resulted in ideologically 
rooted and exaggerated sentiments about the collective.  Such cherished beliefs, 
according to Durkheim, are bound to elicit heightened passions when threatened 
(p. 99). 
 Using interrupted time-series analysis with the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union as 
the “intervention,” ARIMA modeling verifies that the increase in  post-Soviet collapse 
homicide rates are not due to confounding influences (Pridemore, Chamlin, and 
Cochran, 2007).  This lends further support for Durkheim’s thesis that rapid social 
change in a collective yields an increase in deviant behavior, as individual desires replace 
the collective, and the society struggles to adapt to new, and perhaps, unclear norms. 
  In Division, Durkheim argued that societal discordance is due to inadequate 
procedural rules.  With Durkheim’s 1897 publication on suicide rates in France, anomie 
takes on a different meaning.  In Suicide, Durkheim posited that the systematic and 
patterned nature of rates of suicide across social collectives suggested a socio-
structural, rather than individual, explanation for this behavior.  Durkheim developed a 
typology of suicides—egoistic, altruistic, fatalistic, and anomic --  the latter being the 
product of unfulfilled goals and aspirations.  Given the “assumption that man cannot 
limit his ‘passions’” (Olsen, 1965, p. 40), Durkheim theorized that “society alone can play 
this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual” 
(Durkheim, 1997, p. 252).  Durkheim discovered that anomic suicides fluctuate with 
economic and political conditions, especially sudden change, when new rules for 
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interaction have not yet formed (Willis, 1982).  Most interesting is that Durkheim found 
anomic suicide rates to increase not only during economic depressions, as may be 
expected, but also during periods of economic boom.  According to Durkheim, booms 
and busts yield the same result, “because they are crises, that is disturbances of the 
collective order” (1997, p. 246).  Giddens concludes: 
Hence, the causative factor is not the material circumstances themselves, but 
the instability, which they introduce into social life.  In circumstance of social 
disruption, the moral codes that customarily regulate individuals’ social activities 
are placed under stain, and tend to lose their hold (1979, p. 50). 
 In sum, anomie, as developed in Suicide, may be defined as “a condition of 
inadequate moral norms to guide and control the actions of people and groups in the 
interests of the total social system” (Olsen, 1965, p. 41).  Durkheim views the anomie-
crime relationship as normal, even beneficial in a society, as it strengthens the 
conscience collective: 
Crime therefore draws honest consciousnesses together, concentrating them.  
We only have to observe what happens, particularly in a small town, when some 
scandal involving morality has just taken place.  People stop each other in the 
street, call upon one another, meet in their customary places to talk about what 
has happened.  A common indignation is expressed (1984, p. 58).  
Merton 
 If for Durkheim, deviance prevents anomie, for Robert K. Merton, anomie 
produces deviance.  With the 1938 publication of “Social Structure and Anomie,” 
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Merton, argued that the variance in the rates of crime across social collectives could be 
explained by a society’s “dominant cultural ethos,” and what may be termed a “theory 
of social organization” (Messner, 1988, p. 38).  Similar to Durkheim, Merton explains 
differences in crime rates across social aggregates in terms of the fundamental 
properties of social systems.  According to Merton, societies, such as the United States, 
suffer from unusually high rates of crime due to the strong, universalistic emphasis 
placed upon monetary success goals, coupled with a weak emphasis on legitimate 
institutionalized means for achieving these goals.  This configuration and its resultant 
state of malintegration leads to an anomic state that “favors the establishment of 
deviant normative structures and lifestyles” (Passas, 1997, p. 83).   
 For Merton, a healthy society is one in which goals and means are in equilibrium.  
An anomic society is characterized by malintegration.  In the Mertonian explanation of 
anomie, then, it is the failure, not to regulate people’s goals, but rather the means used 
to obtain these goals that become problematic (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001, 
emphasis added).  Merton’s theory of anomie is, then, based upon a disjunction 
between the goals that individuals set for themselves, (or rather, that society prescribes 
that they set for themselves), and the availability of legitimate means, or opportunities 
that are afforded to them (1938; 1968).     
 No true test of Merton’s theory of social organization, or macro-level anomie, 
exists in the literature, although several studies have included variables that tap into 
constructs of inequality/deprivation consistent with the basic premise of anomie theory.  
For example, Blau and Blau (1982), using data for 125 metropolitan areas in the United 
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States, found that “income inequality in a metropolis substantially raises its rate of 
criminal violence” (p. 121, emphasis added).  In their study, the Blau’s conceptualize 
anomie as a general state of “disorganization, distrust, and smoldering aggression which 
easily erupts into violence” (p. 123).  The researchers measure this concept as family 
disruption (percent of population that is divorced/separated).  The Blau’s conclude that 
relative deprivation, especially if ascribed, produces “the most fertile soil for criminal 
violence,” greater than absolute deprivation, measured as poverty, or cultural 
explanations such as the Southern culture of violence thesis (p. 122).   
 Recently, Baumer and Gustafson (2007), developed a precise causal model of 
Merton’s theory and tested classic anomie, integrated with tenets of Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s institutional-anomie theory (discussed below) using macro-level data from 
the General Social Survey (GSS).  In their interpretation, instrumental crime is expressed 
as a function of cultural structure (societal emphasis on pursuing monetary success 
goals, and the emphasis of the collective on pursuing these goals through licit means) 
interacting with social structure (limited access to opportunities (means) of obtaining 
such goals) (p. 621).   
 Using 77 United States geographical areas described in the 1970’s aggregate 
version of the GSS, the researchers measured commitment to monetary success as 
agreement with the statement: “next to health, money is the most important thing.  
“Weak commitment to legitimate means was measure using agreement with the 
statement: “there are no right or wrong ways to make money, only hard and easy ways” 
(Baumer and Gustafson, 2007, p. 633).  The extent of legitimate opportunities (“limited 
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job availability”) was captured by the ratio of the total number of persons 
employed/seeking employment to the number of jobs available in the local labor market 
area.  Additional variation in opportunities was also measured (low educational and 
economic attainment and educational and income inequality).  Institutional anomie 
theory (IAT) measures introduced into the study included the strength of the following 
institutions described in Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory—education, the family, and 
the polity; two other socio-structural variables were included to represent two 
additional institutions—religion and social capital.  Net the effects of appropriate 
controls, the researchers found significant interactions between high commitment to 
monetary success and low commitment to obtaining this success through legitimate 
means, although limited and unequal opportunities failed to moderate this effect as 
suggested by Baumer and Gustafson’s reading of Merton.  The need for “more 
clarification of *Merton’s+ complex arguments, and additional work on translating the 
largely discursive statements into precise and testable causal models” was stressed (p. 
655), as well as calls for further integration of the theories of the anomie paradigm. 
Messner and Rosenfeld’s Institutional-anomie theory 
 In their contemporary elaboration of anomie theory in  Crime and the American 
Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994/2007) sought to expand upon Merton’s 
framework, attempting to explain the structural aspect of the theory beyond Merton’s 
stratification thesis based upon different causal dynamics.  They look to the “patterned 
social relationships that ensure the basic survival requirements of the society are 
fulfilled, i.e. on social institutions,” and the imbalances that may occur between these 
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institutions, as an explanation for the cultural orientations that favor criminal behavior 
(Messner, 2003, pp. 4-5, emphasis in original).  The result is an institutional-anomie 
theory of crime (hereafter IAT). 
True to Merton (1938), Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) theorize a “dark side” to 
the mythos of the American Dream.  They define the American Dream as “a 
commitment to the goal of material success, to be pursued by everyone in society, 
under conditions of open, individual competition” (p. 68).  According to Messner and 
Rosenfeld, four core values underlie this defining characteristic of American culture: (1) 
an “achievement orientation… *where+ failure to achieve readily equates with a failure 
to make any meaningful contribution to society;” (2) individualism, where people are 
encouraged to “’make it’ on their own;” (3) universalism, where all members of society 
are expected to strive for the same goal, regardless of the availability of the means to 
achieve those goals; and (4) “the fetishism of money,” where money is “the metric of 
success” (p. 69-70, emphasis added).  These value components comprise a “dominant 
cultural ethos” of American society that places a strong emphasis on “making it” (i.e. 
monetary success), coupled with a much weaker emphasis on the licit means of 
achieving these goals (Messner, 2003, p. 3).   
Using the United States as the archetypal case, Messner and Rosenfeld posit that 
a climate of competition, individualistic achievement orientation, and pressures to 
accumulate wealth “by any means necessary,” yields a state of structural strain.  This is 
due, in part, to the consistent emphasis and reinforcement of the monetary success-
oriented culture (through outlets such as mass media and advertising), while, at the 
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same time, equal weight is not given to the legitimate channels that allow these 
objectives to be realized (mainly education and employment opportunities).  This 
malintegration of goals and means is a direct theoretical descendant of Merton’s theory 
of social organization; the consequence of this disjunction is anomie.  Under this 
condition, a breakdown occurs in the normative social controls that promote 
conformity, as individuals are unable to attain culturally prescribed success goals when 
the opportunities to do so are beyond their grasp.  Anomic societies are criminogenic 
because “people faced with this contradiction between cultural mandate and structural 
impediment are subject to pressures, or ‘strain’ to abandon legal but ineffective means 
of goal attainment in favor of illegal, effective ones”  (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 
58).   
This cultural ethos does not exist in a vacuum; it is expressed in the social 
structure of a given collective—“structural arrangements that encourage and 
presuppose” these cultural orientations (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 74).  Messner 
and Rosenfeld expand anomie theory beyond mere cultural analysis and stratification. 
Institutional-anomie theory examines the interplay between four primary institutions in 
light of the collective culture of a society.  Messner and Rosenfeld focus on four 
elemental institutions found in social collectives.  The economy functions around the 
production of goods, trade, and distribution, providing the basic requirements for 
sustenance: food, clothing, shelter.  The polity is responsible for the safety and security 
of its citizens from foreign and domestic threats and provides a forum that “mobilizes 
and distributes power to attain collective goals.”  The responsibility of the family is 
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twofold, “regulat*ing+ sexual activity and the replacement of members of society,” as 
well as providing a buffer to and “refuge from the tensions and stresses generated in 
other institutional domains.”  Education provides additional socialization skills, 
preparing children for future occupations, as well as expanding the knowledge base of 
the citizenry (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 72.)   
These institutions are to some degree interdependent and coordinated, held in 
balance by the values of the collective populace.  For example, the economy is 
dependent upon “human capital” produced by the educational system, which is, in turn, 
dependent upon the early socialization of students by their respective families, or 
“cultural capital” (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 73).  The functions of social 
institutions are influenced by the culture of the collective, while, at the same time, these 
institutions “reproduce and sustain cultural commitments…ultimately, where culture 
‘comes from’” (p. 74).   
Messner and Rosenfeld posit initially that, when this “institutional balance of 
power” is tipped so that the economy dominates over non-economic institutions, those 
weakened institutions lose their ability to control the populace (2006, p. 130-131), 
resulting in a state of normlessness, or anomie (Messner, 2003; Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1994/2007; 1997; 2006).  The economy may dominate and tip this “institutional balance 
of power” through three processes.  The first of these mechanisms is devaluation of 
non-economic institutions.  For example, education is regarded as a means to earn a 
degree to obtain employment or to learn a marketable skill, rather than knowledge for 
its own sake.  Likewise, the family’s “breadwinner” is valued over the homemaker or 
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caregiver, and politics is left to the career politician rather than the average citizen 
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 76-79).  A second way that the economy dominates is 
through accommodation.  For example, in the United States, long work schedules and 
overtime is valued, while family and parental leave is given, but often without pay.  
Messner and Rosenfeld note that “parents worry about finding time for their families, 
few workers must ‘find time’ for their jobs.  On the contrary, many feel fortunate that 
the economy has found time for them” (p. 79).  The final manifestation of economic 
dominance is through penetration of “economic norms” into non-economic institutions.  
Education becomes a commodity, while “within the polity, a ‘bottom-line’ mentality 
develops” (p. 83) with notions that government would be more effectively if run like a 
business.  
 Since the original 1994 publication of Crime and the American Dream, Messner 
and Rosenfeld have elaborated upon the idea of institutional-anomie theory to suggest 
alternative configurations of the “institutional balance of power” (2001; 2004; see also 
Rosenfeld, 2004).  The first type, exemplified above, of a strong free-market economy as 
dominant, with non-economic institutions weakened or subsumed by the strength of 
the economy, leads to high levels of “individualistic predatory crime,” including, but not 
limited to, offenses of theft, burglary, and homicide.  A second arrangement occurs 
when civil institutions such as religion dominate.  Here the rules favor “in-group loyalty 
and protection of honor,” producing high levels of “crime-equivalents” such and human 
and civil rights violations.  A third configuration may occur when the state dominates.  
Here, using a game analogy, they suggest that “high priority is given to the rules for the 
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exercise of power… *resulting in+ high levels of corruption and related forms of 
manipulation of personal relationships for unfair advantage” (Messner and Rosenfeld, 
2004, p. 96).  This latter articulation is the focus of the proposed thesis. 
 In sum, Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994/2007) institutional-anomie theory states 
that dominance of the economy coupled with weakened non-economic normative 
controls through the three processes described above, along with an exaggerated 
emphasis on an “unrestrained pursuit of economic achievement,” lead to a Mertonian 
anomic state, as manifested by the disproportionately high crime rates in the United 
States (p. 84).  They do, however, acknowledge that other “rules of the game” may be at 
play in the dominance of other institutional entities, resulting in the rise of different 
types of crime.  Thus, it is institutional imbalance per se, rather than strictly economic 
dominance, that IAT proposes leads to crime.  The literature, however, has narrowly 
focused on this configuration and on street crimes, conventionally defined.  This serious 
limitation robs IAT of full analysis of its scope and generalizability. 
In fact, to date few empirical tests of institutional-anomie theory have been 
published.  Messner and Rosenfeld suggest that this is due to the high level of 
abstraction that “enhances the scope of IAT, *but+ renders empirical assessments 
difficult” (2006, p. 131).  For example, how does one operationalize an “institutional 
imbalance of power” or “dominant cultural ethos”?  Messner admits, “[T]ranslating the 
abstract theoretical claims of IAT into specific empirical propositions is thus a 
challenging, if not daunting task” (2003, p. 9).  This ambiguity of operationalization and 
measurement calls into question whether IAT can be subjected to falsification (Chamlin 
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and Cochran, 2007).  Furthermore, the theory is not amenable to direct testing due to 
the necessity of employing indirect measures of key theoretical constructs.  This 
drawback is not unique to IAT, rather, it is common amongst the majority of macro-level 
theories, especially when cast at a high level of aggregation. Chamlin and Cochran note 
that it is possible to evaluate macro-social theories if, following Blalock (1967), “one can 
make predictions about the relationships between structural predictors and rates of 
behavior that distinguish it from all other competing theories” (Chamlin and Cochran, 
2007, p. 42).  They do so in their initial evaluation of IAT by the inclusion of cross-
product terms to evaluate conditional relationships between the economy and non-
economic institutions.  The findings of Chamlin and Cochran’s (1995) partial test of IAT 
(to be discussed in detail shortly) support their hypotheses that institutional anomie 
theory “uniquely predicts that the effect of economic conditions on profit-motivated 
crime depends on the strength of noneconomic institutions” (Chamlin and Cochran, 
2007, p. 42, emphasis added). 
On a cross-national level, support for or against institutional-anomie appears to 
depend on the nations included in the sample.  Messner and Rosenfeld state that 
“comparisons of developed societies of the world prompt the question of why the rates 
of serious crime are so surprisingly high in one: the United States” (2007, p. 21, 
emphasis added).  In their critical evaluation of IAT, Chamlin and Cochran (2007) 
question this restriction, citing that there are no inherent practical or theoretical 
reasons for excluding less developed nations.  Indeed, their analysis of mean homicide 
and robbery rates for a developmentally diverse sample of nation-stated showed that 
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the rate of serious crime in the United States only appeared “exceptional” if compared 
against a sub-sample of Western European countries.  Messner and Rosenfeld counter 
that, although nations such as the Russian Federation have exceeded the United States 
in overall levels of crime, “what seems to be the most distinctive about crime in the 
United States is its unrestrained and dangerous character” (2007, p. 21), citing the 
American proclivity for firearms.  Nonetheless, the greatest empirical support for the 
theory arises from tests of nation-states at similar levels of industrial advancement, 
which limits IAT’s generalizability (Chamlin and Cochran, 2007; Trent, 2007).   
Additional criticisms of IAT include: (1) the possibility that its scope may be 
limited to instrumental crimes (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995); (2) the concept of 
“economic dominance” is too vague to measure across different cultures both within 
and across nations; (3) IAT fails to incorporate in its analysis variables central to other 
macro-level theories of crime, instead relying on a universal shared value system based 
upon economic roles, risking possible spurious relationships (Jensen, 2002, p. 55-56); 
and (4) it may be “oversocialized,” highlighting Durkheimian sociology while ignoring 
“the genius” of Merton’s theory of deviant motivation (Bernberg, 2002, p. 739).  This 
latter criticism suggests articulating IAT through a multilevel lens (see Baumer, 2007 for 
a multilevel model of Mertonian anomie theory that may be able to inform a possible 
MLM interpretation of IAT). 
The bulk of extant research has sought to use institutional-anomie theory to 
assess the effects of socio-structural and institutional dynamics on crime rates.  Only a 
limited body of research has looked at the value orientations resulting from the 
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“American Dream” and the cultural dynamics at work (Cao, 2004; Chamlin and Cochran, 
1997; 2007; Cullen, Parboteeah, and Hoegl, 2004; Jensen, 2002; Muftid, 2006).  This has 
resulted in incomplete, partial tests of IAT due, in part to the aforementioned difficulty 
in operationalizing and measuring the dominant cultural orientation of a social 
collective.  This synthesis of ideas is necessary in order to lend support to, or dispel the 
“myth” of, American exceptionalism (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2006). 
Institutional-Anomie Theory and Cultural Dynamics 
In Crime and the American Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld ground their theory 
on a basic premise of Mertonian anomie theory—that the exaggerated emphasis placed 
on pecuniary success, countered with only a weak emphasis on the importance of 
legitimate means to achieve these success goals leads to a state of anomie.  Not only is 
this “a normal feature of American culture,” Messner and Rosenfeld argue, “it is an 
integral part of the American Dream” ( 2007, p. 11).  This “anomic quality of life” is put 
forth as an explanation of why the rate of violent crime in the United States consistently 
exceeds that of other, similarly situated industrialized nations (p. 12, 25). 
 To date, few empirical studies have examined the effects of the conflict between 
cultural values emphasizing material success and the available means to achieve these 
ends.  Four studies that have addressed this thesis of IAT have turned to comparative, 
cross-cultural analysis.  Jensen (2002) and Cao (2004) examined the comparative 
cultural dynamics of materialism using items from the World Values Survey.  This 
instrument taps into individual opinions on family, work, religion, and success goals.  
Jensen assessed the premise of American exceptionalism as an explanation for the 
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United States’ relatively higher homicide rate.  He found no support for the notion that 
the United States is inherently more criminogenic nor for the decommodification 
hypothesis as suggested by Messner and Rosenfeld (1997).  Jensen suggests that 
theories focusing on “variation, diversity, and conflict as opposed to economic 
dominance” can explain both crime rates and policies at the cross-national level (p. 69).   
 Similarly, Cao’s (2004) research focused on Merton’s premise that American 
culture is more anomic than other societies, a proposal extended in the work of 
Messner and Rosenfeld.  Cao used the summed score of six items from the World Values 
Survey as a proxy operationalization of anomie (justification of: claiming government 
benefits without entitlement, avoiding fare on public transport, cheating on taxes, 
knowingly purchasing stolen goods, accepting a bribe, and failing to report accidental 
damage to a parked vehicle).  Similar to Jensen (2002), Cao found no support for 
American exceptionalism in the data, controlling for social and demographic covariates.   
 Chamlin and Cochran (2007) utilized two items from the World Values Survey, 
“income is the most important feature of work” and “less emphasis on money and 
material possessions is good,” as indicators of materialistic values.  Additionally, their 
sample included developing and transitional nation-states that were omitted from prior 
cross-national tests.  They found that “while the official homicide and robbery rates for 
the USA are substantial, they are not exceptional” (p. 46).  In addition, the United States 
did not rank highest on the World Values Survey measures included, inconsistent with 
IAT, such that “when compared to a larger and more heterogeneous…sample of 
countries, we find no evidence in support of Messner and Rosenfeld’s core assumption 
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that American culture places an unparalleled emphasis on the acquisition of goods and 
services” (p. 53).  Furthermore, institutional-anomie appears only to hold for advanced 
industrialized nations.   
 In the final cross-national study of IAT’s cultural thesis, Cullen, Parboteeah, and 
Hoegl (2004) applied basic tenets of IAT to managerial ethical reasoning at the cross-
national level, again using World Values Survey data.  Using hierarchal linear modeling 
for individual- and aggregate level- data on 3450 managers from 28 nation-states, the 
researchers found general support for both IAT’s cultural and structural premises as 
predictors of managerial willingness to justify ethically suspect behavior.  This study 
provides the first possible confirmatory link between the dynamics of IAT at the level of 
the social aggregate and that of the individual.  Unfortunately, criminological research 
has not yet attempted to replicate these findings on instrumental crime, perhaps due to 
biases within the discipline in general, and anomie theories in particular, to keep micro- 
and macro- level articulations of theory distinct (Baumer, 2007, c.f. Agnew, 1987; 
Bernard, 1987.  See also Messner, 1988). 
 In a  study that integrated both institutional and cultural dynamics consistent 
with institutional-anomie theory, Muftid (2006) attempted to broadens the theory’s 
analytic scope, examining institutional and cultural values at the micro-level.  While 
institutional-anomie theory was introduced as a possible explanation for serious crime, 
Muftid investigated a minor form of deviance—student cheating.  She rationalized this 
choice stating that “student cheating is one form of instrumental offending because it 
provides the student a type of nonmonetary reward…*g+rades may also be viewed as 
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the currency of academia” (p. 635).  This appears to agree with the spirit, if not the 
letter, of institutional-anomie theory. 
 Muftid tested the hypothesis that U.S. born students will adhere to the 
materialistic values of the American Dream and have a higher likelihood of cheating 
than non-U.S. born students.  Additionally, those students involved in the economy 
(working outside of school) will be more success-oriented and more likely to cheat.  
Finally, students who are involved in non-economic pursuits (family, education, polity) 
will be less likely to engage in cheating, as these institutions will moderate the effects of 
the economically dominant society (2006, p. 636-637).    
 Support for institutional-anomie was mixed in this study.  As predicted by theory, 
students who adhered to the cultural values of the American Dream were more likely to 
cheat, although this was not universal for U.S. born students.  Moreover, those students 
who worked outside of school (actively participating in the economy) reported 
significantly lower instances of cheating.  This was interpreted by the researcher as 
contrary to institutional-anomie theory.  Finally, neither interaction effects (moderation) 
nor mediation by non-economic institutions emerged as significant for this sample. 
Muftid claims this may be due to sample size (N = 162), although this N is actually larger 
than the majority of studies of IAT. (p. 649).  Due to study limitations and 
methodological issues in this study, it is not clear then at this time if IAT is applicable at 
the micro-level or as an explanation of minor forms of deviance.  Indeed, nothing in the 
literature suggested that IAT was intended to explain individual variation or minor 
deviant behaviors. 
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   Finally, Chamlin and Cochran (1997) looked at social altruism, defined as “the 
willingness of communities to commit scarce resources to the aid and comfort of the 
members, distinct from the beneficence of the state” (p. 204).  Consistent with the 
cultural aspect of institutional-anomie theory, along with Braithwaite’s theory on 
reintegrative shaming (1989) and Cullen’s social support theses (1994), Chamlin and 
Cochran hypothesize that communities that place greater emphasis on volunteerism 
and charitable contributions enjoy lower rates of both violent and property crime (p. 
209-211). 
 Social altruism was measured as the ratio of United Way contributions to 
aggregate income in 354 United States cities.  The researchers controlled for both 
absolute and relative economic inequality, urbanism and opportunity measures, and 
demographic variables (1997, p. 211-212).  They found that, consistent with “the logic of 
institutional-anomie theory,” charitable contributions are inversely related to both 
violent and property crime rates, suggesting “communities that effectively teach their 
members to respect and engage in behaviors that promote the welfare of others enjoy 
relatively lower rates of crime” (p. 220-221).  
Empirical Tests of Institutional-Anomie Theory 
  In an analysis of the relationship between social institutions and crime rates, 
Chamlin and Cochran (1995) published the first empirical test of institutional-anomie 
theory using the 50 United States as the unit of analysis.  They noted that a 
comprehensive test of both core tenets of the theory—culture and social structure—
would be difficult, if not premature at the time of their research (p. 415).  Measures of 
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cultural dynamics for the United States were unavailable and, therefore, their research 
focused on the structural effects of economic and non-economic institutions on four 
profit-oriented crimes: robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft, measured as 
aggregate crime rates for 1980. 
 While Crime and the American Dream (2007) laid a foundation for a socio-
structural analysis of crime rates, the authors do not provide detailed 
operationalizations of these constructs, nor do direct measures of these theoretical 
assumptions exist (Piquero and Piquero, 1998).  Chamlin and Cochran (1995) 
operationalized economic deprivation as the “structured opportunities to acquire 
wealth rather than the level of inequality within a collectively” (p. 417), using 
percentage of families below the poverty line as a measure of absolute economic 
deprivation.  The strength of non-economic institutions (as buffers against the anomic 
effect of economic deprivation) was operationalized by three measures:  ratio of yearly 
divorces to marriages per 1,000 (family disruption), adjusted church membership rate 
per 1,000 (strength of religious organizations), and percent of persons of voting age who 
cast ballots in the 1980 congressional elections (strength of the polity).  Recall that these 
institutions are interdependent and that institutional-anomie hypothesizes that a strong 
free market economy coupled with the weakened ability of the non-economic social 
sector to fill a normative role leads to the anomic state (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007).  
To capture this interaction the researchers added three product terms: poverty*family, 
poverty*religion and poverty*polity. 
 Chamlin and Cochran found that the additive effect of the independent variables 
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explained 96% of the variation in profit-oriented crime across the 50 states.  With the 
introduction of each product term into the regression model, the explained variance 
increases 2%, lending support to Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory.  This interaction 
effect is a key contribution and assessed in all subsequent tests of institutional-anomie 
theory; Chamlin and Cochran noted that “it appears that the interplay between 
economic and other social institutions determines the level of anomie within a 
collectively and, in turn, the level of crime” (1995, p. 423). 
 In their second empirical test of institutional-anomie theory, Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1997) examined the effects of decommodification on homicide rates cross-
nationally.  They hypothesized that, similar to the restraining effect on the market by 
non-economic institutions, IAT can be expanded based partly upon Gǿsta Esping-
Anderson’s research on Social welfare systems (1990).  Messner and Rosenfeld apply 
Esping-Anderson’s concept of the “decommodification of labor,” or public policies 
through which “a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” 
(Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 22), to cross-national crime rates..  Messner and Rosenfeld 
looked at three “essential dimensions of entitlements…ease of access to them, their 
income replacement value, and the range of social statuses and conditions they cover” 
(1997, p. 1395), and applied this notion of decommodification to institutional-anomie 
theory.  These social welfare policies provide a bulwark to harsh economic dominance 
that, they believe, contributes to an anomic state and, thereby, crime. 
 As Esping-Anderson’s original study only contains data for 18 capitalist nations, 
Messner and Rosenfeld developed a proxy measure of decommodification so that a 
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larger sample of nations could be analyzed (N = 45 maximum).  Based upon 
International Labor Office data, this proxy measure is comprised of three indicators of 
national expenditures: average annual welfare benefits per household, social security 
expenditures as percent of gross domestic product, and percent of expenditures 
allocated to worker’s compensation (p. 1400).  The researchers’ dependent variable was 
lethal violence, measured as multi-year homicide rate averages. 
 The study supported this precept of institutional-anomie theory, such that, 
across various model specifications (exclusion of Syria as a possible outlier and a smaller 
sub-sample of 39 nations with complete data across all variables), nations exerting 
greater political restraint of the market through social welfare programs and 
expenditures have reduced overall levels of homicide.  In sum, Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
model explains between 32.6% and 48% of the variance in homicides cross-nationally (p. 
1404), while advising that future tests of their theory should include non-economic 
social institutions such as family, religion, and education (p. 1408). 
 While Messner and Rosenfeld provided the first cross-national test of a facet of 
institutional-anomie theory, Piquero and Piquero (1998) provide the first test using both 
varying operationalizations of the strength of two non-economic institutions, along with 
assessing the effects of all four institutions identified in Crime and the American Dream 
on both violent and property crime rates.   
 As a form of sensitivity analysis, Piquero and Piquero (1998) performed separate 
multivariate analyses, first operationalizing polity as percentage of population receiving 
public aid (a decommodification-type proxy measure) and second as percent of citizens 
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voting for in the 1988 presidential election (as a measure of public involvement in 
government).  The researchers represented the strength of education using three 
variables: proportion of population enrolled in college, percentage of high school 
dropouts, and competitiveness of teacher’s salaries when compared to the population’s 
average annual pay (p. 69-70).  Family disruption was measured by the percentage of 
single-parent households; percent of population below the poverty level represented 
the economic dominance construct.  Three interaction terms were introduced to the 
model to evaluate the “interplay” between the economic and non-economic institutions 
(p. 72). 
Regression analyses of the varying specifications yield mixed support for institutional-
anomie theory, with the alternative specifications of polity and education failing to 
reach statistical significance in one model, and contradictory results found in other 
models.  The researchers suggest that “deciding how to indirectly measure variables 
must be undertaken with extreme caution and respect for alternative 
specifications…the conclusions one draws from an indirect empirical test is extremely 
sensitive to the operationalizations of key variables” (p. 80).  Indeed, one of the 
foremost challenges of empirically testing institutional-anomie theory stems from 
“conceptual clarification and measurement”.  As stated by Messner (2003), “IAT 
employs concepts that are highly abstract and amenable to alternative interpretations.  
Such concepts can be rich in meaning, but they defy easy operationalization” (p. 15). 
 Savolainen (2000) examined institutional-anomie theory cross-nationally using 
data from Messner and Rosenfeld’s 1997 study; he also tested the reliability and validity 
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of his findings on a different sample of nations (N = maximum of 45) with partially 
different measures (p. 1027).  The most significant contribution of this parallel sample is 
the inclusion of seven post-Soviet/ Warsaw Pact nations in transition to market 
economies.  Savolainen, as an extension of Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) hypothesis 
that decommodification of labor tames the harsh anomic state caused by the free 
market economy, tested the effects of both the proxy decommodification index and 
welfare expenditures on homicide rates disaggregated by gender. 
 Overall, the findings for the male and female homicide rate were substantively 
the same.  Consistent with institutional-anomie’s decommodification hypothesis, 
nations high on welfare spending have “a very small or nonexistent underclass 
population” (p. 1037), alluding to the interaction effect between income inequality and 
the strength of non-economic normative controls.  Thus, Savolainen found support for 
the moderating effects of both decommodification (explained variance of 32% to 51%) 
and welfare spending (explained variance 38%-76%) on homicide rates (p. 1032-1034).   
 Point estimates for the conditional effects of inequality were calculated for 
Finland (a welfare state) and Mexico (which scored -12.9 on the centered measure of 
welfare spending in these data).  Consistent with IAT, the point estimates for Mexico 
equaled 4.5 (male homicide rate) and 4.91 (female homicide rate), while the predicted 
values for Finland were -5.34 and -6.54, respectively. The latter seems counterintuitive, 
suggesting that income inequality may actually lower the level of homicide, but 
Savolainen notes that this is consistent with the maximin principle theorized in the work 
of John Rawls (1972).  This principle proposes that “a just society is one that maximizes 
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the well-being of the worst off”, such that “income inequality, however large, may be 
acceptable, insofar that it stimulates hard work, innovation, and economic productivity 
in general, and, by way of tax revenues, improves the situation of the poorest segment 
of society” (Savolainen, 2000, p. 1035-1036). 
 Pratt and Godsey (2003) reported results similar to Savolainen using cross-
national sampling and homicide rates as the dependent variable.  This study integrated 
key concepts of Cullen’s social support theory (1994) with Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
concept of decommodification derived from institutional-anomie theory.  Using 
percentage of gross domestic product allocated to health care expenditures as a 
measure of social support, and inequality measured as the ratio of the median incomes 
of the richest to the poorest 20% of citizens, the researchers found that the main effects 
of these key covariates remain statistically significant when controlling for the effects of 
each.  Additionally, these measures interact (β = -.359, p < 0.05), indicating that the 
criminogenic effects of inequality are reduced by high levels of public social support 
(Pratt and Godsey, 2003, p. 626).  This moderating effect is consistent with the 
predictions of both theories.  Moreover, this relationship holds under different sampling 
methods and different modeling conditions to test for spurious relationships.  Pratt and 
Godsey provide possible policy implications, such that “increases in levels of social 
support are capable of producing a concomitant reduction in crime rates even in the 
absence of a social and economic revolution, and that higher levels of social support can 
help to reduce the harmful effects of economic inequality on crime” (p. 631).   
 In a similar vein to the preceding examinations of the effects of 
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decommodification on homicide rates cross-nationally (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; 
Pratt and Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000), Batton and Jensen (2002) examined the 
effects of decommodification on homicide rates sub-nationally using United States data.  
Using time-series analysis, this study analyzed homicide rates for 1900 to 1997 and the 
effects of a time-series decommodification proxy measure, controlling for inflation and 
value of the U.S. dollar (p. 16).  This study is unique among the empirical tests of 
institutional-anomie theory in that it examines historical trends and “*t+he degree to 
which economic fluctuations affect other institutions and relations…related to the level 
of control the state exercises over the economy and the extent to which it attempts to 
mediate the effects of economic fluctuations” (p. 7). 
 While it has been noted that tests of institutional-anomie theory should assess 
the relationship between economic and non-economic institutions cross-nationally, 
Batton and Jensen rejoin, “national data obscure differences that may exist at local, 
state, and regional levels” (2002, p 14).  They argue that city or county level studies  
 might facilitate a more in-depth discussion of the decommodification-homicide 
 relationship by allowing for comparisons between rural and urban areas, which 
 often experience shifts in market forces differently because of employment in 
 difference segments of the labor force (2002, p. 14). 
Additionally, changes in the relations between capital and labor over time should be 
related to changes in the crime rate over time both across and within social collectives. 
 The key finding of Batton and Jensen’s (2002) research was the mixed results of 
the effects of decommodification on homicide rates over temporal variation.  For the 
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period 1900 to 1945, their results generally support institutional-anomie theory; 
however, these results do not carry over to the latter period 1946-1997, which they 
believe suggests that a “turning point” manifests in the post-WWII period (p. 28-29).  To 
date this study has not been replicated in other social aggregates or other historical 
periods and remains the only time-series treatment of IAT.  This is a serious limitation in 
the evaluation of this theory since  Messner and Rosenfeld acknowledge the value of 
“historical research that encompasses time periods long enough to insure genuine 
institutional change” (p. 99).    
 Several other empirical tests of institutional-anomie theory have focused on 
within-nation analysis.  Hannon and Defronzo (1998) examined public assistance as a 
possible buffer to the strain caused by “true disadvantage” in a sample of United States 
counties.  Their analyses explain 71% of the variation in overall crime rates, 68% of 
property crime, and 63% of violent crime (p. 387).  The researchers interpret these high 
level of explained variance as both support for traditional anomie/strain theories, such 
that “welfare allows recipients to legally obtain culturally defined goals, thus reducing 
criminogenic frustration” (p. 389), and for institutional-anomie theory. Welfare allows 
people to maintain a standard of living free of the market, thus lowering levels of 
anomie and allowing social institutions to provide their normative functions. 
 Stucky (2003) focused on one institution described by Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
theory—the polity -- through an integration of institutional-anomie and social 
disorganization theories.  He hypothesized that “local politics can affect minority 
representation, responsiveness of the city government to organized groups within the 
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city, and policy outcomes” and will have a negative affect upon violent crime rates (p. 
1115).  Direct and conditional effects were found, such that district-based political 
representation and cities with African-American mayors reduced crime, while the 
effects of poverty and family disruption were moderated by the strength of mayor-
council type governmental structures.  Stucky interprets this as both support for social 
disorganization theory and Messner and Rosenfeld’s theses on the strength of the polity 
found in institutional-anomie theory. 
 A recent study by Cancino, Varano, Schafer, and Enriquez (2007) continued this 
vein of theoretical integration by combining tenets of social disorganization theory with 
IAT in the context of the systemic network thesis.  Their study focused on community-
level characteristics in a predominantly Latino urban area on the outcome variables of 
both violent and property crime rates.  Cancino et al. found support for both social 
disorganization and IAT, determining that the two theories “can be viewed as 
supplementary…provid*ing+ a more refined picture that explains crime” (p. 80).   
 Maume and Lee (2003) assessed the relationship between social institutions and 
crime and a sub-national level, with counties treated as cases.  The researchers 
examined both instrumental (profit-motivated) and expressive homicides, hypothesizing 
that institutional-anomie will better explain the former (p. 1145).  It is noteworthy that 
this is the first study since Chamlin and Cochran’s (1995) partial test of institutional-
anomie theory to look all four institutions identified by Messner and Rosenfeld—
economy, polity, family, and education; along with religious adherence (as first 
suggested by Chamlin and Cochran, 1995), and political market restraint (Messner and 
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Rosenfeld, 1997).  Inequality (Gini coefficient) was used to measure economic 
dominance; polity is operationalized as voter participation, family disintegration by 
divorce rates.  Educational expenditures and adherence to religious denominations 
were measured to “tap into cross-community variation in support for non-economic 
institutions” (p. 1155), and a decommodification proxy measure, welfare expenditures, 
was added to the model. While prior research suggests that non-economic institutions 
moderate the effects of the economy on crime rates, Maume and Lee’s study represents 
a divergence, suggesting another possible causal link—mediation (p. 1147). 
 Recall Messner and Rosenfeld’s argument that for societies where the economy 
is dominant, a shift in the “institutional balance of power” may devalue, accommodate, 
and penetrate non-economic institutions (2007, p. 76-83).  In an attempt to integrate 
institutional-anomie theory with Marxist criminology, Sims (1997) suggested that “social 
institutions are restricted by the economic base in the degree to which they can shift 
and change” (p. 9).  She also argued that “imbalance [is] a logical result of a capitalist 
economic mode of production” (p. 13, emphasis in original).  Maume and Lee extend 
this point, stating, “the characteristics of the economy in a social system not only shape 
the character of social institutions, but also…the economy will continue to have a direct 
impact on how other institutions function and are able to effectively control criminal 
behavior” (2003, p. 1148).  They introduced a second causal link where the strength of 
non-economic institutions, undermined by the dominance of the economy, directly 
affect, or partially mediate the effect of the economy on, crime rates (p. 1149). 
 Where prior tests of IAT have found moderating effects, whereby the effects of 
51 
 
the non-economic institutions on crime rates is dependent upon the level of economic 
dominance in a given social collective, Maume and Lee’s study supports mediating 
effects of the non-economic institutions on the economic-crime relationship.   Under 
mediation, rather than a simultaneous “interplay” between the social institutions, a 
causal chain is in effect.  The introduction of the non-economic institution variables into 
the negative binomial regression model reduces the criminogenic effects of the 
economic dominance proxy (Gini coefficient).  Only one measure, the 
decommodification proxy, exhibits both mediation and moderation.  Lastly, the 
researchers found their model to particularly salient for profit-motivated homicides; the 
inclusion of the non-economic measures reduced the direct effects of economic 
dominance on homicide rates by 43.2%. 
 Following prior sub-national studies, Kim and Pridemore (2005a), using regional 
data, applied institutional-anomie to transitional Russia.  They sought to explain the 
increase in interpersonal violence that followed Russia’s conversion to a free market 
economy (p. 1378), thus creating a “bridge” between studies tested in the United States 
and cross-national tests of Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory.  Additionally, drawing from 
Bernberg’s (2002) theoretical examination of institutional-anomie theory and consistent 
with the Durkheimian version of anomie theory, Kim and Pridemore suggest that we 
should “expect similar conditioning effects of *non-economic] institutions on any 
association between social change and crime” (p. 1382, emphasis added).  Russia’s 
move toward capitalism, coupled with the likelihood that its citizens have begun to 
adopt the “American Dream” as the “Russian Dream,” could in part explain that nation’s 
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rising crime rates. 
 Kim and Pridemore operationalized institutional-anomie variables similar to prior 
research (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Maume and Lee, 2003), creating an economic 
strength factor, along with family stability, educational strength, and political 
involvement.  Using negative binomial regression techniques, homicide rates were 
regressed on poverty, social institutions, and socioeconomic change variables.  
Following what has become convention in IAT studies, interaction terms were also 
included in the model.  The researchers found support for the Durkheimian social 
deregulation model as suggested by Bernberg (2002); regions experiencing the worst 
effects of rapid socioeconomic change also reported the highest homicide rates (Kim 
and Pridemore, 2005, p. 1391).  They did not, however, find support for the hypothesis 
that non-economic institutions moderate the effects of the dominant economy, with 
none of the interaction terms reaching statistical significance.  This may suggest that 
institutional-anomie theory fails to account for rapid change, and that “any potential 
conditioning effects of social institutions simply may be overwhelmed because the 
changes were so strong and so swift in Russia” (p. 1393).  In a related study, the 
researchers tested IAT to account for serious property crime in Russia (Kim and 
Pridemore, 2005b), but again found support for a Durkheimian interpretation of 
anomie, rather than IAT. 
 The study that most closely informs the current proposal is Schoepfer and 
Piquero’s (2006) examination of the applicability of institutional-anomie theory on 
white-collar crime.  Following Edelhertz’ definition:  
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 an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by 
 concealment or guile to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss 
of  money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage, 
the researchers hypothesized that white-collar offenses “focus on personal or 
organizational gain and therefore are well suited to be studied within the IAT 
framework” (p. 228).  Indeed, institutional-anomie theory suggests a cultural ethos 
whereby it is always possible to obtain more material wealth; the researchers suggest 
that this speaks to the applicability of institutional-anomie theory as “derived from the 
motivations of offending” (p. 203, emphasis added).  Based upon Uniform Crime Report 
data, they looked at a single offense—embezzlement, as it fits into Cressey’s general 
definition of “a quintessential white-collar crime” (p. 233).  The researchers also cite 
previous research that puts forward the opinion that this particular class of “suite” 
offenders has much in common with street offenders (p. 231). 
 While generally supportive of institutional-anomie theory, Schoepfer and 
Piquero found the effects of unemployment to be significant predictors of 
embezzlement, but in the opposite direction than that hypothesized by IAT.  This is 
intuitive.  The very nature of the offense studied, embezzlement, presupposes that the 
offender be employed.  The researchers caution that when examining white-collar 
offenses, economic variables such as unemployment should be handled as opportunity 
controls rather than economic disadvantage measures (p. 233).  Overall, despite 
limitations such as measurement issues of both the independent and dependent 
variables, coupled with the previously discussed difficulty in operationalizing IAT 
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measure in general, this study fills a gap in the literature similar to the study proposed 
herein. 
Alternate configurations of institutional imbalance 
 The overarching trend in the aforementioned research indicates that economic 
dominance, coupled with enfeebled non-economic institutions incapable of exerting 
their normative controls leads to anomie, which, in turn, results in high crime rates 
across social collectives.  Messner and Rosenfeld note that “the principal claim of 
institutional anomie theory is that institutional imbalance per se, and not simply 
dominance of the economy” (2001, p. 155, emphasis in original) is responsible for these 
high crime rates.  As previously touched upon, other “rules of the game” exist, whereby 
“analytically distinct configurations that reflect differences in the institutional balance of 
power” predict different types of crime (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 96).  Table 2 
displays these configurations. 
Table 2: Crime types by dominant institution and cultural conditions 
Dominant institution Cultural condition Predicted crime 
Economy Anomie Instrumental crime 
Civil (i.e. religion, ethnic, kinship) “Hypermoralism” “Crime equivalents”  
State Moral cynicism/withdrawal Corruption 
 In societies with strong civil institutions, such as kinship systems, ethnic 
fractionalization, or religion, dominance may lead to “a kind of extreme moral vigilance 
or hypermoralism” (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 156, emphasis in original).  Under 
this configuration, societal members develop a strong sense of obligation to those with 
which they share social, ethnic, or religious identities.  The “other” becomes the enemy 
and the victim of, what Messner and Rosenfeld term “crime equivalents,” acts that may 
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or may not be condemned by codified law--repressions of personal freedoms, hate 
crimes, violations of human rights, vigilantism, ethnic cleansing, and the like.  This 
institutional arrangement and the resultant cultural condition “encourages crimes in 
defense of the moral order itself, albeit understood in narrow and highly particularistic 
terms” (p. 156). 
 Rosenfeld suggests this articulation of IAT may provide an explanation for 
terrorism: 
Terrorism is also nourished under the dominance of the primordial institutions in a 
world in which contrasting institutional arrangements have been on the 
ascendance for two centuries...religious and ethnic solidarity, real and imagined, 
figures predominantly as a protest ideal against the rationalism and universalism 
of the modern world. (2004, p. 25) 
  The third possible configuration is that by which the institutional balance of 
power tips in favor of the state.  Under this arrangement, the emphasis is on the 
“exercise of power” (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 96).  State-dominance may 
manifest in ways similar to those discussed earlier, namely devaluation of non-political 
institutions, accommodations to the state by other institutional bodies, and penetration 
of political or ideological norms into these entities.  A historical archetype of this state-
dominant society may be exemplified by the Soviet Union. 
  Under this state-dominant arrangement, government control is infused into 
otherwise “naturally” autonomous realms (Garland, 1997).  During the totalitarian rule 
of Josef Stalin in the 1930’s, virtually every normative social institution was torn 
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asunder or subordinated to the needs of the state.  The traditional family was devalued 
as a “bourgeois institution.”  Any cohabitation could be considered a family, abortions 
were available on demand, and divorces were obtained simply by requesting one, 
sometimes by “simply as sending a postcard” (Hosking, 1992, p. 213).  It was only when 
the low birth rate began to cause a significant reduction in military conscripts that 
media propaganda began to extol marriage as a duty to the state.  Abortions were 
outlawed, and divorce made prohibitively expensive.  The Russian Orthodox Church 
became the rival to the state’s “all-embracing ideology,” which had begun to take on 
the “claims and attributes of an established church” (p. 227).  Religious repression led to 
underground secret services.  Muslims in the Soviet Union were forced to 
accommodate (under threat of arrest) to the demands of the state, phasing out sharia 
courts and “voluntarily” converting mosques into schools, clubs, and cinemas (p. 239).  
Penetration of Soviet ideology was apparent in all realms of social life, especially in the 
schools.  Soviet schools taught both political and technical curriculums in order to 
prepare future workers who were “above all party men” (p. 208, emphasis in original).  
Other historic and contemporary examples of state-dominance include: state control of 
the birth rate (China), economic statism (Italian fascism), single-party states (Ba’ath 
party of Syria), and nationalized education (Cuba), while other nation-states may also be 
thought to lie somewhere on an autocracy-democracy continuum.   
  Messner and Rosenfeld suggest that “as the state assumes an ever expanding 
role  in regulating everyday life, the opportunities for the exercise of personal agency 
are diminished...a sense of direct responsibility for the well-being of others accordingly 
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atrophies” (2001, p. 155).  Elements of social capital, such as altruism and empathy 
toward others, are reduced.  This leads to cultural conditions characterized by “moral 
cynicism”; the resultant state is one of high levels of corruption and other self-serving 
crimes of power (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 25). 
  What each of these institutional configurations lacks is the balance that the 
normative properties of institutions provide; each is “incomplete in an important sense.  
They fail to incorporate the moral codes associated with other institutions” (Messner 
and Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 156).  The influence of strong families and educational 
institutions as a buffer against state dominance is intuitive; each provides an escape and 
a refuge from the repression of a dominant government.  In addition, both provide a 
socialization function.  These mechanisms are similar to the normative influences of 
these institutions in an economically dominated society, as described in the 
conventional reading of IAT.  The possible moralizing effect of the third institution—the 
market, is less obvious and warrants further discussion. 
Markets, Morality and Crime 
  The topic of markets and morality can be framed under two opposing 
viewpoints described by Hirschman (1992, cited in Rosenfeld and Messner, 1997).  
Under what Hirschman terms the self-destruction thesis, capitalist markets erode 
institutional controls “to the extent that they free persons from the restraints on self-
interested behavior imposed by political, social or moral obligations and ties” 
(Rosenfeld and Messner, 1997, p. 209).  This thesis, found in the extant tests of IAT 
where a dominant economy is seen as criminogenic, is theoretically informed by 
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Marxist and radical accounts of capitalism.  Under this arrangement, traditional social 
relations “have been 'torn asunder' in the process of capitalist development” without 
the replacement of substitute values save for efficiency and profit (p. 209).  In this 
economic system, individuals become egoistic.  According to Bonger, this society is 
“based upon exchange *that+ isolates the individuals by weakening the bond that unites 
them” (1969, p. 41).  It is in this societal model where markets become disembedded 
from and dominate over other social institutions, and where “the pursuit of private gain 
becomes the organizing principle,” (Currie, 1991, p. 255) that is the basis for the 
conventional reading of IAT as an explanation of instrumental crime.   
  For the proposed study, however; it is necessary to consider, an opposing 
viewpoint, what Hirschman terms the doux-commerce thesis.  Based upon liberal 
political and economic theory of the enlightenment, and found in the writings of David 
Hume and Adam Smith, under the doux-commerce principle the market functions as a 
“civilizing” force, replacing the barbarism of feudal society.  Under this configuration:   
market involvement promotes personal attributes such as thrift, industriousness, 
honesty, and reliability, behaviors that are required to sustain the central 
organizing principle of markets: reciprocity. (Rosenfeld and Messner, 1997, p. 
208) 
 Historian E.P. Thompson (1963, cited in Karstedt and Farrall, 2006) similarly 
describes the “moral economy” of markets as “grounded in a morality of fairness, 
justice, roles and rules, and shared notions of acceptable behaviours [sic.], profits and 
entitlements” (p. 1014).  Thus the doux-commerce thesis prescribes a “happy marriage” 
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between the individual and the collective: “*t+he image is one of sovereign and rational 
individualists with a strong self-interest in preserving mutually beneficial, cooperative, 
and trusting exchange relations with others”.  In this capacity, the market may then be 
considered an institution of normative control, “pacify*ing+ the irrational brutalities, 
moral cynicism, and withdrawal caused by dominance of the state and “enhanc[ing] the 
moral order of society” (Rosenfeld and Messner, 1997, p. 208-209). 
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Chapter Four 
Data and Methods 
  Messner and Rosenfeld note, “the principal claim of institutional anomie theory 
is that institutional imbalance per se, and not simply dominance of the economy” (2001, 
p. 155, emphasis in original) is responsible for high crime rates.  As previously discussed, 
“analytically distinct configurations that reflect differences in the institutional balance 
of power” predict different types of crime (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 96; See 
Table 2, this thesis).  Messner and Rosenfeld propose that, in societies where the state 
dominates the other institutions, high levels of corruption can be expected, leading to 
the first hypothesis: 
H1: The level of state dominance (defined herein as the absence of popular control 
over the state) is positively related to corruption cross-nationally. 
 In their initial partial test of IAT, Chamlin and Cochran (1995) posed that 
institutional anomie theory hypothesizes that a strong free market economy, coupled 
with the weakened ability of the non-economic social sector to fill a normative role, 
leads to an anomic state.  According to Chamlin and Cochran “it appears that the 
interplay between economic and other social institutions determines the level of 
anomie within a collectively and, in turn, the level of crime” (p. 423, emphasis added).  
Thus, a conditional relationship is expected, such that: 
H2: The effects of non-polity institutions will moderate the criminogenic effects of 
61 
 
state dominance. 
This moderation hypothesis has been supported in the literature (Hannon and 
DeFronzo, 1998; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Piquero and Piquero, 1998; Savolainen, 
2000, Schoepfer and Piquero, 2006; Stucky, 2003); however, in their sub-national test of 
IAT, Maume and Lee (2003) suggest another possible causal link—mediation.  According 
to the researchers, “the characteristics of the economy in a social system not only shape 
the character of social institutions, but also…the economy will continue to have a direct 
impact on how other institutions function and are able to effectively control criminal 
behavior” (2003, p. 1148, emphasis added).  Maume and Lee’s study supports this 
mediation hypothesis, which has also has garnered preliminary support at the cross-
national level (Bjerregaard and Cochran, forthcoming, Trent, 2007).  This leads to a third 
hypothesis: 
H3: The effects of non-polity institutions will mediate the criminogenic effects of 
state dominance. 
 Finally, although often omitted in empirical tests, Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
theory contains a cultural element in addition to its structural component.  In the 
alternate, state-dominant configuration of IAT as tested in the current study, the 
dominant cultural ethos of the state-dominated society is not one of anomie, but rather 
one of moral cynicism (Rosenfeld, 2004).  Under this arrangement, individuals eschew 
personal responsibility and are characterized by marked interpersonal distrust.  At the 
aggregate level, this cultural orientation is conducive to high levels of corruption.  
Therefore, 
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H4: Nations whose cultural value systems exhibit high levels of moral cynicism will 
 have higher levels of corruption. 
Design Strategy and Research Purpose Revisited 
  The dominant strategy of both data collection and data analysis is quantitative 
toward the end of empirically testing hypotheses derived from an alternate 
configuration of institutional-anomie theory.  Here the purpose is to confirm (or refute) 
this alternate configuration of Messner and Rosenfeld’s IAT theory and examine the 
relationships between its theoretical constructs and corruption cross-nationally.  
Specifically, what is the relationship between state-dominance and corruption at the 
cross-national level of analysis?  Do the effects of the economy, the family, and/or 
education attenuate that relationship, or do they interact?  Is there a relationship 
between the cultural value system of a nation, measured as an aggregate response to 
an opinion survey, and the level of corruption in that nation? 
Methodological considerations in cross-national research 
Extant research in comparative criminology falls into three general 
methodological approaches: case studies, parallel studies, and multinational, “large-n” 
quantitative analyses (Howard et. al., 2000, Neapolitan, 1999).  The first type of 
comparative research is an in-depth case study, generally macro-level, of one nation.  
While critics have claimed that this type of research is not comparative, a 
methodologically sound case study both increases the knowledge base of the discipline 
(Bennett, 1997; Howard et. al., 2000; Flyvberg, 2006) and provides a potential for future 
replication with positive, negative, and/or non-conforming cases (Brady and Collier, 
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2004).  A majority of published criminological research on corruption falls into this 
single-nation category (e.g. Brovkin, 2003; Green, 2005; Lu and Gunnison, 2003; 
Markovskaya, Pridemore, and Nakajima, 2003; Rodgers, 2006). 
 Parallel studies such as topical comparison (e.g. Neapolitan, 1994; 1999) provide 
an opportunity to compare and contrast crime rates and/or criminal justice systems 
across nations.  As pointed out by Howard et. al. (2000), this methodology allows for 
comparisons that are more meaningful, overcoming many of the difficulties resulting 
from the lack of comprehensive macro-social data.  The researcher is able to account for 
and better explain differences in police reporting, local historical and cultural 
differences, and political and economic structures, although generalizability of results 
diminishes.  Criminologists have used this methodology to examine corruption 
victimization in Latin America (Seligson, 2006), corruption in post-communist countries 
(Karklins, 2002; 2005; Karstedt, 2003; Sajó, 2003), and civil versus common law 
responses to corruption (De Sousa, 2002). 
Multinational quantitative methods use the nation as the unit of analysis, 
examining theoretically derived correlates of crime such as income inequality, social 
disorganization measures, or modernization, usually through multivariate regression 
analysis.  The advantage of this method is its ability to test hypotheses, as well as to 
identify patterns and trends across different societies (Howard, et. al, 2000; Neapolitan, 
1999).  A majority of studies use homicide rates as the dependent variable, and with 
good reason; compared to other offenses, the availability and relative validity and 
reliability of the data is greatest for homicide (e.g. Chamlin and Cochran, 2005; Gartner, 
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1990; LaFree, 1999; LaFree and Drass, 2002; Messner, 1982; Messner and Rosenfeld, 
2007; Neapolitan, 1994, 1999; Pampel and Gartner, 1995; Savolainen, 2000).  Others 
have looked at other violent and/or property crimes (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman and 
Loayza, 2002; Krohn, 1978; Krohn, and Wellford, 1977; Jensen, 2002; Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 2007; Neapolitan, 2003; Stack, 1984).  While growing in the political science, 
public administration,  and economic disciplines, “large-n” comparative studies of 
corruption cross-nationally are limited in the criminological literature (for exceptions 
see Sung, 2004; Xin and Rudel, 2004), or restricted to descriptive analyses. 
  As the purpose of the proposed study is to test hypotheses at the cross-national 
level, variable-based, “large-n” regression analysis is the most appropriate research 
strategy.  This method is not without limitations.  The operationalization of highly 
abstract theoretical constructs reduces these social processes simply to a collection of 
variables to be “accounted for”, rather than nations as “meaningful wholes” 
(Goldthorpe, 1997, p. 2).  This simplification tends to ignore the causal processes and 
the historical, cultural, social, and economic antecedents and trends that contribute to a 
nation’s aggregate rates of corruption.  This drawback is noted; however, as this study is 
exploratory in nature, multivariate analysis retaining the largest number of cases is most 
suitable to the task of evaluating theory. 
Sample 
 The appropriate level of analysis for the proposed study is that of the nation-
state.  The universe is all legally sovereign and independent nation-states.  For 
quantitative analysis, ideally, a random sample would be drawn from the population of 
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approximately 1933 entities recognized by international bodies; however, practical 
concerns influence the sample used the in the final analysis. 
 Perhaps the bane of cross-national and macro-social research remains the 
limited availability of reliable comparative data across theoretical constructs (Bennett, 
1980; Bennett and Lynch, 1990; Boyle, 2000; Howard et. al., 2000; Karstedt, 2001; 
Krohn, 1978; Krohn and Wellford, 1997; Marenin, 1997; Neapolitan, 1997, 1999, 2003).  
The researcher often cannot efficiently and feasibly collect all of the desired data due to 
cost, language barriers, and difficultly and resistance from the national stakeholders.  
Additionally, these data are rarely compiled systematically within respective nation-
states.  This necessitates the use of secondary data.  Following Bennett and Lynch 
(1997), the sample for the quantitative analysis in the proposed study will be limited to 
nations available in existing data sets with complete data across all key variables.   
 Extant empirical assessments of institutional-anomie theory, where the level of 
analysis is the nation-state, have used samples ranging from 33 to 84.  Cases were 
included because either they had complete data across all variables or imputation 
methods were utilized to maximize the amount of nations available for analysis 
(Chamlin and Cochran, 2006, 2007; Jensen, 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Pratt 
and Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).  In the present study, data are obtained primarily 
                                                 
3
  Based in part upon the list of countries and territories assigned a three-digit International 
Standard ISO 3166-1 Code for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions as used by 
the Statistics Division of the United Nations (see 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm), nations recognized by the United States 
Department of State (see http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm), and The World Factbook (see 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html). 
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from the Shared Global Indicators Cross-National Database (Norris, 2008), which 
compiles data on over 700 indicators from several published sources for 191 nations.  
Full variable descriptions and sources of data appear in Appendix A.  Due to missing 
values, the current study includes a maximum of 125 nations. 
        Dependent variable 
 In the study of crimes of the powerful, there are innate practical limitations in 
the choice of definitions that can be applied and the data that can be used.  The hidden 
nature of corruption makes this crime inherently difficult to study (Karklins, 2002, Xin 
and Rudel, 2004; Zimring and Johnson, 2005).  Initially, the United Nations Surveys on 
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems officially recorded cross-
national corruption and bribery rates appeared promising4 (Burnham, 1998) 
 Ten waves of annual data have been collected by the United Nations Crime and 
Justice Information Network (UNCJIN) since 1975.  Data for these surveys are collected 
via voluntary surveys sent to both member and non-member nation-states.  Each survey 
year contains official recorded instances of crime disaggregated by offense.  Relevant to 
the current study, this dataset includes bribery rates, defined as: 
Bribery and/or corruption may be understood to mean requesting and/or 
accepting material or personal benefits, or the promise thereof, in connection 
with the performance of a public function for an action that may or may not be a 
violation of law and/or promising as well as giving material or personal benefits 
                                                 
4
  In a white paper published by the U.S. Department of Justice, Barnett (2002) states that bribery 
is the most reported and cleared white-collar offense using NIBRS; at the cross-national level, however; 
this indicator appears quite unreliable for comparative analysis. 
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to a public officer in exchange for a requested favor.  (United Nations, n.d., p. 5-
6) 
 Following Bennett and Lynch (1990), it is instructive to note that, while the use 
of official crime rates may be deceptive in evaluating the exact amount of crime in any 
given nation, it has been found reliable in determining and comparing trends across 
social collectives.  We should be able, then, to assess the efficacy of institutional-anomie 
theory cross-nationally by analyzing these trends and their relationship to a bribery 
rates and to draw reasonable conclusions.   
 Preliminary analyses using the United Nations dataset proved both instructive 
and disappointing.  The sixth (1995-1997) and seventh waves (1998-2000) of the United 
Nations Survey were used; to control for annual fluctuations, the average bribery rate 
was computed from the annual recorded data.  Only twenty-nine of the ninety-two total 
respondent nations had complete data across all IAT indicators, an attrition rate of 
almost 68%.  As crime rates are rare events and the dependent variable was 
overdispersed, effects were estimated using Poisson-based negative binomial regression 
analysis (Osgood, 2000).  When regressed on the cultural and institutional variables 
identified by institutional-anomie theory (to be discussed shortly), the direct effects 
model as a whole was not significant (χ² (df) = 9.43(5), p > 0.05).  Individual coefficients 
and incidence-rates ratios (IRR) are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
68 
 
Table 3: Negative binomial regression estimates for bribery rates, cross-national data (N = 29), 1995-
2000 
Variable Coef. S.E. I.R.R. S.E. 
State dominance -.34 .37 .71 .27 
Industrialization -1.04 .61 .35 .21 
Family disruption .04 .04 1.0 .04 
Education .35 .42 1.4 .60 
Moral cynicism .90 .39* .41 .15* 
     
Pseudo R-square .069    
Log-likelihood -63.44    
χ² (df) 9.43(5)    
* p < 0.05 
Only one predictor reaches statistical significance in this model.  The cultural condition 
of moral cynicism is positively related to bribery rates, as suggested by theory.  This 
should be approached with caution; since the model itself is not significant, this 
relationship is likely significant purely by chance (McClendon, 2002, p. 172). 
 The reliability and validity of cross-national crime statistics is often suspect 
(Vigderhous, 1978).  This is due to problems at the level of data collection, rather than 
methodological concerns (Bennett and Lynch, 1990; Reichel, 1999).  Based upon this 
preliminary analysis, United Nations data are inappropriate for the present study, as the 
measure of official bribery rates cross-nationally provides little confidence in the 
results—they simply do not allow the researcher to adequately answer the research 
questions and test the alternative configuration of IAT.  Furthermore, it is unclear if we 
are measuring incidences of corrupt acts, the quality of law enforcement, courts and 
prosecutors, and/or anti-corruption policies. 
 Similar to the “dark figure of crime,” there exists a “dark figure of corruption,” 
whereby many acts of official malfeasance go unreported and undiscovered.  Only some 
crimes are reported to the police who, in turn, may only record a portion of incidents.  
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Furthermore, when looking at the offense of bribery, the police themselves are often 
the offender.  At the level of grand or systemic corruption, a single, identifiable victim 
may not even exist.  Errors may be aggravated by (1) definitional discrepancies, or the 
legal definition of bribery in differing jurisdictions (Huang and Wellford, 1989); (2) 
differing levels of reporting crime to the police or different traditions of policing.  For 
example, in nations where the state is dominant, residents may have little or no 
confidence in the authorities and/or fear retribution by the very nature of the offense 
(for example, bribery) being studied (Marenin, 1997; Rosenfeld, 2004).  Unfortunately, 
these nations are the most interesting cases.  Finally, (3) different socio-economic and 
political contexts could lead to different levels of reporting and recording (i.e., poorer 
nations may not have the available resources to adequately and systematically collect 
valid and reliable data).  As noted by Jacobs (2002), “it is hard to think of any other 
crime that so lacks an indicator of prevalence” (p. 88).  
  An alternate to official incidence rates exists for offenses of corruption and 
bribery—corruption perceptions indices.  Both the World Bank Group (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi, 2003) and Transparency International (TI) provide indicators of 
corruption perceptions cross-nationally based upon multi-source surveys of 
international organizations, think tanks, citizens, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and business risk analysts from both within and outside individual nation-states.  
Using similar methodologies, these “polls of polls” measure the perceptions of the 
overall climate of corruption in a given nation as perceived by those stakeholders who 
“have strong incentives to gauge corruption as accurately as possible” (Montinola and 
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Jackman, 2002, p. 156).  Both the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 
Control of Corruption measure and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (TI-CPI) are considered valid and reliable indicators of a nation-state’s level of 
corruption, measured as perceived levels (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007; 
Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2000; Xin and Rudel, 2004).  As the level of 
corruption varies widely not only across, but within nations, it has been suggested that 
measuring the true magnitude of corruption, especially in large, diverse countries 
“probably cannot exist in principle” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 31).  Furthermore, as 
suggested by Meny (1996), due to the clandestine nature of corruption, frequency 
estimates measuring the prevalence of corrupt practices are as much “a matter of 
perception and feeling” as the “mathematical measurement of the phenomenon” (p. 
310, emphasis added).  Thus, the use of corruption perception measures, such as those 
published by the World Bank and Transparency International, are likely the best 
measure to gauge the level of corruption in a nation for large-n, comparative, cross-
national hypothesis testing. 
  Although the World Bank Corruption Control measure and Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index are compiled from different sources, the two 
are highly correlated (r = .98) and thus the latter is chosen for the current study based 
upon the nations (N = 180 maximum) and years recorded.  Transparency International is 
a non-partisan, global civil society organization geared toward measuring corruption 
cross-nationally and propagating the anti-corruption movement.  The organization’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) is a composite index of survey data, the first 
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systematic attempt to measure corruption cross-nationally using the same metric for 
each nation.  The most recent CPI (Lambsdorff, 2007) includes 14 sources, originating 
from 12 independent institutions, and covers 180 nations.  For a country to be included, 
it must feature at least three polls.  Poll inclusion is contingent upon the following: (1) 
the source must include a ranking of nations for comparative purposes, and (2) the poll 
must not include other issues such as political instability or decentralization.  Overall 
correlation between the respective sources is, on average, 0.77 indicating that the 
individual assessments do not differ substantively (for full methodology of the CPI, 
please consult Lambsdorff, 1998; 2007). 
 Transparency International has been criticized on its methodology for its use of a 
bootstrapping approach when the number of sources for a nation is small, which can 
result in spuriously small amounts of variance and exaggerated estimates (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003).  Sajó has been critical of  indices measuring corruption 
“perceptions” in general, claiming that these instruments “gain *their+ own dynamic” 
(Sajó, 2003, p. 177), measuring not “real corruption”, but rather corruption as 
“imagined” by the general public, who are, in turn, informed by pollsters (p. 176).  
Additionally, Sajó argues that perception indices label a whole society, creating the 
“image of a massive, homogenous wrongdoing” in a way that is at the same time 
“overinclusive and underinclusive” (p. 177).   
 Criticisms notwithstanding, the TI-CPI has been used in prior studies when the 
purpose is comparative research (Goldsmith, 1999; Karstedt, 2003; 2007; Sung, 2004; 
Treisman, 2000; Xin and Rudel, 2004), and, based upon the current study’s research 
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purpose, it remains the most appropriate index.  The TI-CPI provides a large number of 
observations from nations at varying stages of development across several years, 
necessary for testing the hypotheses at hand.  For the present study, the dependent 
variable represents a nation’s TI-CPI score, reverse-coded so that higher scores indicate 
“cleaner” nations.  To control for annual fluctuations and the possibility of high-profile 
scandals skewing results, annual scores are averaged for the years 2000-2005.   
Independent variables  
 Among the greatest challenges to empirical tests of institutional-anomie theory, 
is the difficulty in operationalizing its highly abstract theoretical claims (Messner, 2003; 
Messner and Rosenfeld, 2004; 2006).  As IAT is cast at a high level of abstraction, the use 
of proxy measures is necessary; “IAT employs concepts…amenable to alternative 
interpretations.  Such concepts can be rich in meaning, but they defy easy 
operationalization” (Messner, 2003, p. 15).  Moreover, prior research has suggested that 
IAT is sensitive to the operationalization of its key variables (Piquero and Piquero, 1998).  
This challenge is magnified in cross-national research, when an “operational calculus 
[must be employed] to ensure that the variables reflect the same concepts in [different] 
cultures” (Bennett, 1980).  The current study uses conventional indirect proxies gleaned 
from existing tests of IAT and cross-national corruption studies (when possible). 
Defining and operationalizing “moral cynicism”  
 In the economic-dominant/anomic configuration of IAT, Messner and Rosenfeld 
(2007) draw from Merton’s (1938; 1968) perception that the anomic state is created in 
societies where, within the culture of the collective, there is malintegration between the 
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emphasis on the pursuit of goals and the available normative means to achieve these 
goals: 
“On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of 
accumulating wealth and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to 
do so institutionally” (1938, p. 679).  This “cultural ethos” manifests in a “distinctive set 
of value commitments”—an achievement orientation, individualism, universalism, and a 
“fetishism of money” (Messner, 2003, p. 6-7).  Operationalizing and quantifying this 
cultural ethos has proven most difficult, and, as a result, it is often omitted from the 
bulk of tests of institutional-anomie theory.  Several researchers have, however, used 
social surveys such as the World Values Survey  to capture this crucial facet of IAT’s 
theoretical framework (See Cao, 2004; Chamlin and Cochran, 2007; Cullen, Parboteeah, 
and Hoegl, 2004; Jensen, 2002).   
 In the present test of the state-dominant configuration of IAT, the dominant 
cultural ethos is not a malintegration between goals and means, but rather between 
state regulation at the structural level and personal agency and direct responsibility in 
the citizenry.  Rather than a manifestation of anomie, in the current study the 
researcher must operationalize and quantify moral cynicism at the aggregate level.  First 
this concept must be defined. 
 Based upon differing dominant institutions and resultant cultural conditions, 
Messner and Rosenfeld suggest that the varying forms of institutional imbalance are 
possible; each believed to produce diverse offense types (2001; 2004; Rosenfeld, 2004; 
Refer to Table 2, this thesis).  The authors, however, do not provide any guidance on the 
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conceptualization or operationalization of IAT’s key constructs, including what they term 
“moral cynicism.”   
 Referring back to the theoretical roots of anomie , Durkheim claims that moral 
feelings toward others are strongest in social groups when individual members are 
bound by attachment and commitment to, and involvement in the group (1961).  In his 
review of Durkheim’s sociology of morality, Hearn states that, for autonomous 
individuals in modern societies, commitments to “the collective ideal” and group 
membership “shield*s+ them from anomic forces and the state’s tendency toward 
totalizing control” (1997, p. 82).  He goes on to say that “communitarian 
interdependencies… feed the trust, responsibility, and sense of morality on which rest 
responsible neighborhoods” (p. 33).  If strong feelings of mutual responsibility, 
interpersonal trust, and social group membership are the hallmark of well-functioning 
societies, then, as Hearn notes, malfunctioning societies are those marked by distrust, 
where informal social controls are replaced by “formal, impersonal, and repressive 
modes of regulation supplied by the state, police, and courts” (p. 34).   
  In his ecological theory of deviant places, Rodney Stark proposes that densely 
populated neighborhoods will display high levels of “moral cynicism”, which he defines 
as “the belief that people are much worse than they pretend to be…serv*ing+ as inferior 
role models for one another” (1987, p. 896).  This leads to low levels of interpersonal 
trust amongst members of the collective.  According to Braithwaite, effective social 
control relies on communitarian interdependencies.  Once these bonds between 
members of the collective are severed, “moralizing social control collapses, *and+ a 
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vacuum is created that will attract the most brutal, repressive, and intrusive of police 
states” (1989, p. 186). 
 The writings of Durkheim, Hearn, and Braithwaite suggest that the direction of 
causality is from moral cynicism to a repressive polity, while Jacobs (2002) notes that 
political corruption leads to a “dispirited and alienated citizenry” (p. 83).  In their 
discussion of the alternative configurations of IAT, Messner and Rosenfeld speculate 
that, in state-dominant societies, societal members are characterized by their “moral 
cynicism,” “withdrawal,” and by a“ lack of personal agency” or responsibility in the 
citizenry, suggesting a concomitant relationship between moral cynicism and state 
repression (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 25).  While the direction of causality and possible 
feedback loops cannot be estimated in the current cross-sectional study, from these 
speculated relationships, an operational definition of moral cynicism can be formed.  For 
this study, the dominant cultural orientation of moral cynicism is understood as an 
aggregate of atomized, distrustful individuals, withdrawn from the collective—anti-
communitarian, and anti-altruistic, and devoid of personal civic responsibility.     
 In the tradition of prior research that has attempted to operationalize and 
measure culture at the aggregate level (Cao, 2004; Chamlin and Cochran, 2007; Cullen, 
Parboteeah, and Hoegl, 2004; Jensen, 2002), the current study uses the World Values 
Survey, an instrument that endeavors to capture individual sociological, cultural, and 
political values and opinions cross-nationally.  The World Values Survey (originally the 
European Values Study, cited a such), has been conducted in four waves since 1981 and 
consists of about 250 questions yielding more than 800 variables that capture individual 
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sociological, cultural, and political values of residents of a maximum of 90 nations.  An 
average of 1300 face-to-face interviews is conducted in each country by a network of 
social scientists (full methodology is available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org).  For the 
present study the 2000 World Values Survey is used; aggregated responses (see Liska, 
1990) on three items represent measures of “cynical orientation” and interpersonal 
distrust (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 155).   
 The first indicator is the total number of voluntary organizations (including 
church or religious, sport or recreational, art, music or educational, environmental 
organization, professional association, and/or charitable organization) in which 
individuals report membership.  The mean value was calculated for each nation and 
signified that nation’s overall level of commitment and involvement in communitarian 
and voluntary endeavors.  The second measure captures the aggregate level of citizen’s 
views on personal responsibility and agency based upon the aggregated mean response 
to the following:  
 “How would you place your views on this scale?  One suggests that “the 
government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
for” and ten means that “people should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves”.  
Additionally, Stark posits that high levels of moral cynicism will be accompanied by 
correspondingly high levels of interpersonal distrust.  Rooted in social capital theory 
(Putnam, 2000), interpersonal distrust has been linked to corruption in a sample of Latin 
American (Morris, 2004) and post-Soviet nation-states (Fish, 2003).  For the current 
77 
 
study, the lack of social trust is captured by the response to the following question, 
aggregated to the mean level for each country: 
 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?  (One to five scale where higher 
values indicate distrust) (European Values Study Group, 2004). 
 In order to preserve degrees of freedom, factor analysis is used in order to 
reduce these three measures into a single variable using principal components analyses 
(PCA).  The voluntary organization and personal responsibility and agency variables load 
on the same dimension (factor loading = 0.858; Eigenvalue = 1.47), and explain 73.7% 
percent of the variance.  This measure also exhibits a high degree of internal consistency 
(α = 0.83).  This measure is reverse-coded (*(-1)) so that higher values indicate higher 
levels of moral cynicism.  The measure of interpersonal distrust does not appear to tap 
into the same latent construct as the previous two measures and will be entered into 
the regression analysis separately. 
State Dominance 
While Crime and the American Dream focused on an institutional arrangement 
dominated by the economy, Messner and Rosenfeld also envision another possible 
configuration; a “tip” in the institutional balance of power where the state is dominant.  
This arrangement leads to “high levels of corruption and related forms of manipulation 
of personal relationships for unfair advantage” (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 96).  For the current 
study, in order to conceptualize state dominance, an appropriate definition of its 
antithesis is first supplied.  This study uses Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy or 
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pluralism (rather than democracy, which Dahl regards as an unachievable ideal).  
According to Dahl, a polyarchy consists of  
 [C]ontrol over government decisions about policy is constitutionally 
vested in elected officials; (2) elected officials are chosen in frequently 
and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively 
uncommon; (3) practically all adults have the right to vote…(4) practically 
all adults have the right to run for elective offices…(5) citizens have the 
right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on 
political matters broadly defined; (6) citizens have the right to seek out 
alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of 
information exist and are protected by law; and (7) citizens…have the 
right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, 
including independent political parties and interest groups (1982, p. 11). 
State dominance is thus operationalized by first constructing a multi-
dimensional, multi-source polyarchy scale and then reversing to a one-to-five scale of 
state dominance.  This variable then is essentially the lack of “popular control over the 
state” (Fish, 2005, p. 21). 
As the concept of polyarchy is multi-dimensional; multiple measures are used to 
tap into this complex construct.  The first set of variables is from the Governance 
Indicators Index published by the World Bank Group (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
2003; 2007).  This perception-based, or subjective, set of aggregate indicators has been 
collected annually since its inception in 1996; the latest survey in 2007 is based upon 
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311 variables from 33 different sources and covers 212 nations.  Survey respondents 
include NGOs and commercial risk analysts, multilateral development agencies, and 
internal and external observers.  The survey employs an Unobserved Component Model 
(UCM) to aggregate responses into six dimensions: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann et. al., 2007).   
The current study utilizes three disaggregated measures of “good governance” 
that agree with Dahl’s concept of polyarchy: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, 
and rule of law.  The first captures the extent to which citizens are able to select their 
leaders and participate in the political process.  This measure falls in line basic tenets of 
public choice/principal-agent theory, such that, in closed polities, principals lack the 
ability to monitor the agents, providing an opportunity structure conducive to corrupt 
practices (Jain, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). 
Regulatory quality, although not specified by Dahl, indicates “the incidence of 
market-unfriendly policies such as price controls.”  Low levels of regulatory quality are 
indicative of policies of economic statism—or state interference in the free market.  
Montinola and Jackman have stated that market competition is a “necessary condition 
for honest government” (2002; p. 151), and economists have suggested that corruption 
disrupts the competitive nature of the market, distorting “what should be at arms’ 
length or objective and unbiased, relationships between government officials and 
private sector individuals” (Tanzi, 1998, p. 111.  See also Ades and DiTella, 1997; 2000; 
Gerring and Thacker, 2005; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000).   
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Rule of law captures the “lawyer’s approach” to the study of corruption, or the 
extent to which “agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society”, including 
the “effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary” (Kaufmann, 1998, p. 143).  This 
“indicator measures a society’s success in developing an environment in which fair and 
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions” (Kaufmann et. al, 
2003, p. 4).  Multi-year averages spanning five years of annual data (2000-2005) on each 
governance indicator are used in the current study. 
Two measures published by Freedom House (2004) are employed in the current 
study.  The Freedom House Civil Liberties and Political Rights Index is comprised of a 1-
to-7 scale (free to not free) and is based upon the United Nations 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  The social activist school of thought suggests that the 
absence of civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, associational and organizational 
rights, and personal autonomy, greatly increases political corruption (Kaufmann, 1998).  
The Freedom of the Press index is a 1- to-100 scale that rates nations based upon the 
legal environment for reporting and political pressures on journalists.  Both indices are 
based upon in-depth nation summaries compiled by a team of regional experts and 
scholars; historical background and current events are also included in the overview of 
the country.  One hundred and ninety-two nation-states and 14 territories are included 
in the final index.  In the current study, both indices are reverse-coded for 
interpretability, so that higher scores equal greater freedom.   
Finally, two additional composite indices of democracy are used.  The Vanhanen 
Index (VI) covers the period 1810 through 1998.  The VI is an objective index that 
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combines two basic dimensions of democracy—competition (% seats occupied by 
dominant party) and participation (electoral turnout) (2000).  These measures are 
aggregated using the following formula: 
C(ompetition)*P(articipation)/100 
The Vanhanen Index  has also been called “the polyarchy dataset”  due to its proximity 
to Dahl’s concept of polyarchy.  Competitive government reduces corruption since party 
turnover minimizes opportunities, while a larger “selectorate” yields greater 
transparency amongst the politicians (Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 153-154). 
 The Cheibub standardized scale is based upon Cheibub and Ghandi’s six-fold 
classification of regime type (monarchic dictatorship, military dictatorship, civilian 
dictatorship, presidential democracy, mixed democracy, parliamentary democracy).  
This scale covers the years 1946-2002; higher scores designate greater popular rule 
(2004).  Rose-Ackerman (2001) has found that corruption is correlated with the 
constitutional structure of a given country, ranking parliamentary systems as best at the 
avoidance of corruption and party-centered presidential (presidential democracy)as 
worst.  Nations under dictatorships are often predatory kleptocracies, where economies 
become wealth-building mechanisms for those in power, at the expense of the populace 
(Jain, 1998). 
In order to preserve degrees of freedom, the polity measures described above 
are factored into a single polyarchy variable using principal components analysis (PCA).  
The resultant values are then multiplied by (-1) in order to remove negative scores for 
interpretability and, finally, one-to-five scale is created.  This scale indicates the level of 
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state dominance, or the lack of popular rule, in a given nation-state.  Factor loadings, 
Eigenvalues, and percentage of variance explained are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Principal components analysis for eight dimensions of polyarchy 
Variable Factor loadings Eigenvalues % of variance 
Voice and accountability .982 7.19 79.87 
Regulatory quality .894   
Rule of law .846   
Political rights .931   
Civil liberties .950   
Freedom of the press .930   
Vanhanen Index .648   
Regime type (Cheibub) .781   
α = 0.70 
Extant research has suggested that the democracy-corruption relationship is U- 
(quadratic) or S- (cubic) shaped (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004).  As the 
current study’s measure of state dominance is, in essence, the inverse of polyarchy (or 
democracy), it is instructive to assess the functional form that the state dominance-
corruption relationship takes in the current data.   
TI-CPI scores were plotted against the state dominance scale, and the resultant 
distribution followed an s-shaped, or cubic, pattern as evidenced by the blue fit line (R2 
= 0.819) in Figure 2 (below). 
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While hierarchal polynomial regression is the preferred method of estimating 
the parameters for nonlinear y-x relationships, the transformation of the non-linear x to 
higher-order polynomials results in regression coefficients that become difficult to 
interpret (Fox, 1991).  In the current study, these interpretability issues would be 
compounded, since the key independent variable, state dominance, is a factor score 
derived from six components, each of which capture a dimension of polyarchy.  Finally, 
as the moderation hypothesis of the current study suggests a non-additive relationship, 
the use of higher-order polynomials would further muddle any clear substantive 
interpretation of the regression parameters.  As the research purpose of the current 
study is not to assess the functional form of the state dominance-corruption 
 
Figure 2: State dominance-corruption functional form 
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relationship, but rather to test hypotheses derived from an alternate configuration of a 
criminological theory, an alternate strategy is warranted. 
Another  method of “straightening out” non-linear associations is the use of 
power transformations of x that allow the model to be “fit” using ordinary-least-squares 
regression.  The shape and direction of the curvature produced by the non-linear x-y 
relationship determines which direction one moves on the power ladder (see Tukey, 
1977).  Based upon Figure 2 (above), the first segment of the S-curve is a concave U-
shape, as state dominance and corruption both initially increase.  Next, the curve 
appears to somewhat level out, before again increasing.  As the overall curve appears 
monotonic, the power transformation for the concave U-shape is either the natural log 
(lnx) or the negative inverse of x (-1/x) (Fox, 1991).  As shown below (Figure 3), the 
negative inverse (-1/x) transformation yields the closest approximation to linearity 
(again, indicated by the blue fit line), with the R-squared value of the linear equation 
increasing from 58% to 79%.  Figure 4 shows the log transformation of x, which only 
increases the linear fit to approximately 71%. 
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Figure 3: State dominance-corruption, reverse inverse transformation 
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Figure 4: State dominance-corruption, log transformed 
 
Economy 
 The role of the economy is to provide for basic human subsistence necessary for 
humans to adapt to their environment (for example, food, clothing, shelter).  A standard 
strategy in tests of IAT has been to operationalize and measure the strength of the 
economy based upon an indicator of absolute (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Piquero and 
Piquero, 1998) or relative deprivation (Maume and Lee, 2003; Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1997; Pratt and Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000), or unemployment rates (Schoepfer 
and Piquero, 2006).  The preferred method uses relative deprivation, typically the Gini 
coefficient, as this indicator includes reference groups (Passas, 1997), although recent 
research by Pridemore (2008) suggests that the deprivation-crime relationship becomes 
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null when a proxy for poverty (infant mortality) is entered into the equation.  This 
finding suggests that reference groups may not be as influential as previously believed.  
For the study of corruption, the use of inequality as an indicator of the economy 
is problematic.  One of the most damaging consequences of corruption is the 
accumulation of wealth to the (already) privileged at the expense of the poor.  Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (1998) found that, across 37 nations, corruption and the 
Gini coefficient were positively related, net the effects of other exogenous variables.  
Additionally, this impact remains significant when controlling for GDP.  Other research 
has questioned the direction of causality of this relationship, suggesting that inequality 
and poverty is likely both a cause and a consequence of corrupt governments (Husted, 
1999; Lambsdorff, 1999).  The cross-sectional nature of the current study precludes 
testing this last hypothesis. 
Consequently, the proposed study marks a departure from the bulk of prior 
research by conceptualizing the strength of the economy by the level of industrial 
development within a nation.  Empirical studies suggest that industrialization is a valid 
indicator of the dominant economic system within a country (Bonger, 1969; Cullen, 
Parboteeah, and Hoegl, 2004; Esping-Anderson, 1990; Krohn, 1978), and prior research 
has linked industrialization, measured as government subsidies to manufacturing as a 
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), to reduced levels of corruption (Ades 
and DiTella, 1997). 
In the current study, industrialization is operationalized via the following proxy 
variables: commercial energy use (oil equivalent) per capita (kilograms) 1980-2002, 
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electric consumption per capita (kilowatt-hours) 1980-2001, and the average 
percentage of population living in urban areas (1990-1998).  Commercial energy use 
measures levels of resources used in the industrial production of goods, as does electric 
consumption per capita.  Urban population is a consequence of industrialization, as 
citizens flock to city centers for work, citizens who also contribute to an increase the 
consumption of electricity.  Additionally, a nation’s overall wealth is captured by its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ppp), averaged for the years covered by the current 
study (2000-2005).  Research has shown that poorer countries are, in general, more 
corrupt than wealthier counties (Andvig et. al, 2000; Mauro, 1995), as they lack the 
resources to effectively fight corruption.  Finally, the economic distribution by sector 
(percent non-agrarian) measures the distribution of the domestic product and labor 
force involved in both the industrial and service sectors.  PCA results are shown in Table 
5. 
Table 5: Principal components analysis for five dimensions of industrialization 
Variable Factor loadings Eigenvalues % of variance 
% of GDP non-
agriculture 
.769 2.79 69.84 
Commercial energy use 
.864   
Elec. consumption  
.838   
Urban population (%) 
.868   
GDP (ppp) .789   
α = 0.65 
Family 
 Functioning similar to the conventional social bond in micro-level control theory 
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(Hirschi, 1969), the family “provide*s+ for the literal reproduction of the population over 
time, and for the socialization, nurturance, and care of societal members” (Messner, 
2003, p. 5).  Additionally, the family provides a buffer from the stresses of the other 
institutional domains (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007). 
 Empirical tests of IAT have operationalized this concept as family disruption 
using divorce rates (Batton and Jensen, 2002; Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Jensen, 2002; 
Maume and Lee, 2003; Schoepfer and Piquero, 2006), or the percentage of single parent 
families (Kim and Pridemore, 2005; Piquero and Piquero, 1998).  Divorce rates at the 
cross-national level are limited to a small number of nations making this variable 
unviable for the current study.  Instead, a measure of female economic activity was used 
to measure family disruption.  The current study employs a measure from the United 
Nations Human Development Report (2003) that reports the percentage of women over 
the age of fifteen who work outside the home.  Admittedly, when compared to divorce 
and single parenthood, female employment is certainly not as disruptive to the 
traditional nuclear family, yet it may suggest that children are, at least for a period of 
time during the day, left alone in the home or under the supervision of older family 
members or non-familial child care workers. 
Education 
 The role of education, similar to the family, is socialization, “but it also facilitates 
the creation and transmission of knowledge” (Messner, 2003, p. 5).  In the literature, 
education has been operationalized as enrolled in college full time (Kim and Pridemore, 
2005; Piquero and Piquero, 1998), comparative teacher salaries (Piquero and Piquero, 
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1998), percentage of high school dropouts (Piquero and Piquero, 1998; Schoepfer and 
Piquero, 2006), and/or school expenditures (Maume and Lee, 2003).  One study by 
Mauro (1997) found a significant negative relationship between  public education 
expenditures and corruption.  The proposed study follows this convention using a factor 
variable comprised of the combined gross enrollment ratio for primary, secondary, and 
tertiary schools (2004), and the mean adult literacy rate (age 15 and above, 2000-2002).  
Both measures load on a single factor (factor loading = 0.819; Eigenvalue = 1.34), 
explaining 67.1% of the variance.  Internal consistency is less than desired (α = 0.5) as 
this measure is only constructed from two components. 
Control variables  
 Known correlates of corruption are included in the regression analysis to control 
for possible spurious relationships.  First, a population heterogeneity factor variable is 
created, comprised of ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et. el., 2002), and the Gini 
coefficient (United Nations, 2004).  Studies suggest that ethnic divisions impact the 
quality of institutions; indeed, ethnic conflict has been associated with poor economic 
performance and policy and political instability, as well as higher levels of corruption 
within nations (Alesina et. al, 2002, Mauro, 1995, Morris, 2004; Treisman, 2000).  The 
fractionalization variable is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of 
ethnolinguistic group shares, and signifies the probability that two randomly selected 
persons from a population will belong to different groups.  The theoretical maximum is 
reached when each individual belongs to a different group (or the value of 1) (Alesina et. 
al 2002, p. 156).  For the current study, the combined linguistic and racial/ethnic 
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variable from the Norris (2008) dataset is used.   
 The second dimension of population heterogeneity is economic disparity, herein 
defined as income inequality, as captured by the Gini coefficient. Cited as both a cause 
and consequence of corruption, “inequality in the distribution of wealth and income 
tends to reproduce power differentials in society that foment corruption” (Morris, 2004, 
p. 4.  See also Goudie and Stasavage, 1998).  Based upon the Lorenz curve, the Gini 
coefficient is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1, where 0 denotes perfect 
equality (everyone earns the same amount) and 1 denotes perfect inequality (one 
individual holds all of the income) (Sen, 1973).  Gini coefficient values from the United 
Nations Human Development Report (2004) are used in this study.  Principal 
components analysis (PCA) indicates that these measures load on a single factor (factor 
loading = 0.816; Eigenvalue = 1.33), explaining 66.6% of the variance.  While the 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.32 is lower than desired, this is likely due to the limited 
number of components.  Regression analysis was performed used an un-collapsed 
version of this measure with no substantive change in the results. 
 The literature has also linked government size to levels of corruption within 
nation-states (Husted, 1999, Morris, 2004; Treisman, 2000; Xin and Rudel, 2004).  Larger 
bureaucracies tend to increase corruption opportunities by the sheer number of officials 
who hold a monopoly over resources needed by citizens (Husted, 1999).  In particular, 
less-developed and developing countries tend to have over expanded, large state 
sectors when compared to nations in the industrialized world (Theobald, 1990).  
According to LaPalombara, there exists “a rough correlation between how much of GDP 
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a government gets its hands on and how much corruption exists” (1994, p. 338).  The 
size of government in the current study is measured as central government 
expenditures are a percentage of GDP.  Five-year averages covering the years included 
in this study (2000-2005) are estimated. 
 To control for historical effects, a dummy variable is created to indicate if the 
nation was formerly a British colony (“0” = no; “1” = yes).  Treisman (2000) discovered a 
strong, negative relationship between British heritage and current levels of perceived 
corruption—a reduction of nearly two points on a ten-point corruption index, while no 
significant relationship emerged between “never colonized” nor French or 
Spanish/Portuguese colonization and corruption (p. 418-419 See also Sandholtz and 
Koetzle, 2000).  Treisman credits this negative British heritage-corruption relationship to 
a particular “legal culture” left behind by the colonizers, a culture that emphasizes 
judgment based upon precedence rather than legal codes as well as “procedural justice 
over substantive issues” (p. 422).  
 Finally, empirical analysis has found the Protestant religious ethos to reduce 
corruption due to its “emphasis on individual responsibility for moral conduct and its 
generally less tolerant attitude toward human failing” (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000, p. 
40.  See also Lipset and Lenz, 1999; Treisman, 2000).  In the current study, 
predominantly Protestant is measured as a dichotomous variable (“0” = no; “1” = yes).  
Data for both the former British colony variable and predominantly Protestant are from 
the Norris dataset (2008).  
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Analytic strategy 
 After a brief examination of the descriptive (univariate) and bivariate statistics, 
multivariate analysis will be estimated using ordinary least-squares regression (OLS).  
Baseline levels of the strength and direction of corruption perceptions regressed on 
state dominance, net the effects of the control variables, will be estimated.  The 
possible causal link of mediation will be tested by examining the direct effects of all 
variables in the model.  Should the inclusion of the non-polity variables reduce the 
magnitude of the effects of state dominance, this shall indicate partial mediation; full 
mediation would occur if state dominance were to become non-significant or change its 
algebraic sign (Baron and Kenny, 1986).  In order to assess the possible moderating 
effect of the non-polity variables, a series of models will be run with the inclusion of 
cross-product interaction terms (e.g. state*economy, state*family, etc.).  Diagnostic 
tests will be performed to determine if any serious violations to the assumptions of OLS 
exist (Fox, 1991).  Results will be discussed along with directions for future research and 
a discussion of the study’s limitations. 
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Chapter Five 
Results 
The following analysis was conducted in order test the following four hypotheses 
(as described in Chapter 4): 
H1: The level of state dominance (defined herein as the absence of popular 
control over the state) is positively related to corruption cross-nationally. 
H2: The effects of non-polity institutions will moderate the criminogenic 
effects of state dominance. 
H3: The effects of non-polity institutions will mediate the criminogenic 
effects of state dominance. 
H4: Nations whose cultural value systems exhibit high levels of moral 
cynicism will have higher levels of corruption. 
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 6 (below); the final column lists zero-order 
correlations (Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (r)) for the dependent 
and key independent variables.  For the nations included in this study, the average level 
of corruption is four, based upon the one-to-ten Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (TI-CPI).  Finland ranks lowest in corruption, while the TI-CPI ranks 
Bangladesh as the most corrupt. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics and selected zero-order correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. Min.  Max.  r** 
Dependent 
variable 
     
Corruption 4.03 2.09 9.50  1.22  
Independent 
variables 
     
State dominance 2.67 1 1  4.62 .78† 
Industrialization -.02 .99 -2.01  3 -.82† 
Family disruption 53 14.26 29.20  82.60 .13 
Education 0 1 -.2.25  1.40  -.22 
Moral cynicism -.08 .93 -1.79  1.08  .11 
Interpersonal 
distrust 
3 1 0  5  .65† 
Controls      
Population het. .05 1 -1.95  2   
Government size 16.05 6.21 5  29.9   
Prev. British 
colony 
0*     
Protestant 0*     
* Dichotomous variable, statistic is mode 
** Zero-order correlation between theoretical variables and corruption (TI-CPI).   
† p < 0.05
5
 
 
The average level of state dominance in the nations sampled is 2.67 (based upon 
the non-transformed, one-to-five state dominance scale).  The highest levels of 
dominance appear to cluster in African (Sudan = 4.62, Zimbabwe = 4.51, Cameroon = 
4.04, Guinea = 4.02, Togo = 4.01) and post-Soviet nations (Uzbekistan = 4.53, Belarus = 
4.40, Tajikistan = 3.96).  The lowest levels of state dominance are found in Nordic social 
democracies, with Denmark, Sweden, and Norway each scoring a one.  Zero-order 
correlations between state dominance and corruption perceptions suggest a fairly 
robust relationship at the bivariate level (r = 0.78)  
 Of the other social institutions identified in Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory, the 
strength of the economy (operationalized as the level of industrialization within a 
nation) is highest in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
                                                 
5
  All p values are based upon a one-tailed test. 
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(OECD) nations (e.g. Iceland, Norway, Canada, Sweden, and the United States) and 
lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Togo, Cameroon, and Sudan).  
Industrialization exhibits a strong, negative relationship with corruption perceptions (r = 
-0.82).  In the nations sampled, a little over half of females age fifteen and up work 
outside the home (53%)—the current study’s proxy of family disruption.  Female 
economic activity is lowest in Syria (29.2%) and highest in Mozambique (82.6%).  
Educational strength, measured as a factor score comprised of literacy rates and gross 
enrollment, is highest in Spain and lowest in Ethiopia.  At the bivariate level, neither the 
family disruption proxy, nor the education measure, is significantly related to corruption 
perceptions. 
 Of the two cultural measures included in the analysis, moral cynicism 
(operationalized as the aggregate number of voluntary organizations to which citizens 
belong and scores on a personal responsibility and agency scale) is lowest in the United 
States (-1.79), and highest in former-Warsaw Pact and -Soviet states (Ukraine = 1.10; 
Croatia = 0.95, Belarus = 0.87, Lithuania = 0.76, Latvia = 0.70, Hungary = 0.69).  This 
measure does not exhibit a significant relationship with the corruption perceptions 
measure.  The second cultural measure, interpersonal distrust, is lowest in the Nordic 
states (Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway = 0) and highest in two Latin American 
nations (Peru and Brazil = 5).  Interpersonal distrust is positively associated with cross-
national corruption perceptions, and this relationship is fairly strong (r = 0.65) 
 The control variables indicate that, in this sample, population heterogeneity is 
lowest in Japan, and highest in Syria, with the distribution following a normal curve.  The 
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average level of central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP (government 
size proxy) is 16.05%.  Only about one-forth (24.7%) of the nations sampled are 
predominantly Protestant, and 33.2% were former colonies of Great Britain. 
 As two of the structural IAT indicators, as well as the cultural interpersonal 
distrust measure, are significantly related to corruption at the bivariate level, 
multivariate analysis is warranted in order to disentangle the unique effects of each 
when controlling for the other variables in the model.  First, the effects of state 
dominance and the control measures on corruption perceptions will be estimated in 
order to provide a baseline analysis for comparison.  Next, a model that includes the 
other, non-polity, institutions identified by IAT will be added to assess whether these 
variables mediate the relationship between state dominance and corruption.  Then, a 
series of models will be run, each including one of the following cross-product terms—
state dominance-industrialization, state dominance-education, and state dominance-
family disruption.  These interaction terms will be used to test for moderation effects 
between the component variables.  Next, the full IAT model identified in the mediation 
model will be analyzed with the addition of the two cultural measures—moral cynicism 
and interpersonal distrust, to see if the introduction of these cultural factors produces 
an increase in the overall variance explained, as determined by a significant change in 
the coefficient of determination (R2).  Lastly, in order to assess the efficacy of the model, 
the results of regression diagnostic testing will be discussed.  All models are estimated in 
SPSS using ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression.  
Multivariate models 
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  Table 7 presents the regression results for the direct effects of state dominance 
on corruption perceptions, controlling for population structure, government size, and 
known historical correlates of corruption.  As a whole, this model is statistically 
significant,  
Table 7: Corruption perceptions (TI-CPI) regressed on IAT indicators 
 Baseline model Mediation model 
Variable 
 
b β t b β t 
State dominance (-1/x) 9.37 .87 14.33** 7.08 .65 9.76** 
Industrialization    -.76 -.31 -4.72** 
Education    .12 .05 1.08 
Family disruption 
 
   .01 .06 1.43 
State X Industrialization       
State X Education       
State X Family disruption 
 
      
Population heterogeneity -.11 -.05 -.92 -.01 .00 -.06 
Government size -.04 -.10 -2.00 ** -.02 -.03 -.76 
Fmr. British colony -.38 -.07 -1.64* -.45 -.08 -2.07** 
Protestant -.04 -.01 -.17 -.21 -.04 -.80 
       
F-statistic (df) 94.7 (5)** 82.1(8)** 
Adjusted R
2
 .80 .86 
Δ R
2
  .06** 
 N = 121 N = 109 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05   
(F = 94.7, p < 0.05), explaining 80% of the variation in corruption perceptions across the 
nations sampled.  In order to introduce linearity to the state dominance-corruption 
relationship, the negative inverse (-1/x) of the state dominance scale was substituted for 
the five-point state dominance scale in this, and all subsequent, all estimations.  Net the 
effects of the control variables, state dominance is significant and positively related to 
corruption perceptions, such that a one unit increase in state dominance yields a 9.37 
increase in corruption perceptions.  Moreover, this relationship is quite robust (β = 
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0.87). 
Mediation 
 As discussed in Chapter Three,  Messner and Rosenfeld argue that, for societies 
where the economy is dominant, a shift in the “institutional balance of power” may 
devalue, accommodate, and penetrate non-economic institutions (2007, p. 76-83).  
Maume and Lee extend this point such that,  “the characteristics of the economy in a 
social system not only shape the character of social institutions, but also…the economy 
will continue to have a direct impact on how other institutions function and are able to 
effectively control criminal behavior” (2003, p. 1148, emphasis added).  They introduced 
a second causal link where the strength of non-economic institutions, undermined by 
the dominance of the economy, directly affect, or partially mediate the effect of the 
economy on, crime rates (p. 1149).  Extrapolating this finding to the current study, the 
researcher expects that the effects of the non-polity institutions will mediate the 
corruption-prone tendencies of dominant states. 
 In order to test for mediation effects, the non-polity variables (industrialization, 
education, and family disruption) were added to the baseline model.  As shown in the 
second panel of Table 7 (above), the addition of these mediator variables significantly 
increase the explained variance by 6% (F change = 10.43, p < 0.05).  Should the state 
dominance variable become non-significant or reverse its algebraic sign due to the 
inclusion of the non-polity variables, this would signify full mediation (Baron and 
Kenney, 1986).  As indicated by the significant t-value and positive unstandardized beta 
for state dominance, this is obviously not the case in the present data, however; the 
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unstandardized beta is reduced 24.47% when the additional institutional variables are 
added to the model (b = 7.08); this suggests partial mediation.  Furthermore, this 
attenuation is significant (p < .01, two-tailed test) based upon the statistical test for the 
equality of regression coefficients developed by Paternoster et. al (1998). 
z      =       b1 – b2 / √SE b1
2 + SE b2
2 
  z     =       2.29/ √(.428)2 + (.527)2 
  z =  2.34 
Only one of the non-polity institutions is exerting this mediating effect.  Industrialization 
(proxy variable for economic strength within a nation-state) was negatively related to 
corruption perceptions, such that a one-unit increase in industrialization results in a 
0.76 reduction on the TI-CPI.  This is consistent with Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) 
argument that the economy acts as an institution of normative control, as first 
suggested by liberal political and economic theories of the enlightenment, later echoed 
in Hirschman’s doux-commerce thesis (1992.  See Chapter Three, this thesis).  
Consistent with prior bivariate findings (See Table 6), neither education nor the family 
disruption measures produces significant direct effects on corruption. 
Moderation 
 Chamlin and Cochran (1995) first identified an “interplay” and interdependency 
between IAT’s social institutions using non-additive modeling.  In the current study, 
three product terms (state-industrialization, state-education, and state-family) were 
added to the full socio-structural model to test for moderating effects.  In creating these 
interactions, the variables were mean-centered prior to transformation in order to 
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eliminate multicollinearity between the component variables and their product terms 
(McClendon, 1994).  Regression results appear in Table 8 (below).  
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Table 8: Corruption perceptions (TI-CPI) regressed on IAT indicators, moderation models 
 Full IAT structural model Moderation model 1 Moderation model 2 Moderation model 3 
Variable 
 
b β t b β t b β t b β t 
State dominance (-1/x) 7.08 .65 9.76** 6.36 .59 8.67** 6.67 .62 7.77** 7.08 .65 9.27** 
Industrialization -.76 -.31 -4.72** .10 .04 .31 -.81 -.33 -4.68** -.76 -.31 -4.51** 
Education .12 .05 1.08 -.02 -.01 -.19 .39 .14 1.17 .12 .05 1.06 
Family disruption 
 
.01 .06 1.43 .01 .07 1.90* .01 .05 1.23 .01 .06 .60 
State X Indust.    1.70 .41 3.15**       
State X Education       .67 .11 .86    
State X Family  
 
         0 .00 .10 
Population heterogeneity -.01 .00 -.06 -.01 -.01 -.10 .00 .00 .04 -.01 -.00 -.06 
Government size -.02 -.03 -.76 -.02 -.03 -.74 -.01 -.03 -.61 -.02 -.03 -.75 
Fmr. British colony -.45 -.08 -2.07** -.55 -.10 -2.6** -.45 -.08 -2. 04** -.45 -.08 -2.04* 
Protestant -.21 -.04 -.80 .08 .02 .32 -.14 -.02 -.52 -.21 -.04 -.76 
             
F-statistic (df) 82.1(8)** 80.6(9)** 72.9(9)** 72.2 (9)** 
Adjusted R
2
 .86 .87 .86 .86 
Δ R
2
  .01** 0 0 
 N = 109 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 
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Panel 1 shows the regression estimates for the full structural IAT model in order 
to provide a baseline for model comparison.  Moderation model 1 introduces the state- 
industrialization interaction term.  At the model level, the inclusion of this product term 
significantly increases the explained variance by one percentage point (F change = 9.90, 
p < 0.05) confirming the necessity of the non-additive model.  The significant t-value for 
the state-industrialization product term suggests that the effects of these institutions do 
interact (b = 1.70).  In other words, the effect on state dominance on corruption 
perceptions is dependent upon a nation’s level of industrialization.  The positive sign 
attached to the coefficient indicates that, contrary to the doux-commerce thesis, higher 
levels of industrialization increase corruption perceptions when the level of dominance 
by the state is high.   
This finding may be indicative of the fact that, for autocracies and dictatorships, 
economic statism is present, such that the “naturally” autonomous realm of the 
economy has been nationalized by the state (Garland, 1997).  Examining a scatterplot of 
TI-CPI scores against industrialization (see Figure 5, below)  confirms that corruption 
perceptions are relatively high, even in the presence of high levels of industrialization in 
the oil-producing rentier states of  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
and Qatar.  Indeed, political scientists have advanced rentier state theory to explain 
authoritarianism and resistance to democratization in the petroleum-rich states of the 
Middle East (Smith, 2004), nations where oil revenues enable the state to “buy off 
political consensus” (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987, p. 7).  Natural resource abundance has 
been positively linked to rent-seeking activities and corruption in the literature (e.g. 
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Ades and DiTella, 1999; Fish, 2005; Lambsdorff, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; 
Robbins, 2000, Treisman, 2000). 
Figure 5: Corruption perceptions and industrialization scores 
 
 
As shown in moderation models two and three (Table 8, above), the inclusion of 
the state-education and state-family interaction terms do not increase the overall 
predictive power of the model, with both explaining approximately 86% of the variation 
in corruption measures, the same as the direct effects baseline model.  Furthermore the 
F-change statistic fails to reach significance in either model two (F change = .73, p > 
0.05) or model three (F change = .00, p > 0.05). 
 
105 
 
Cultural indicators 
Although generally omitted in empirical tests of IAT due to lack of data, Messner 
and Rosenfeld’s theory of crime includes a cultural, as well as structural, component.  In 
the alternate configuration of IAT tested in the present paper, the dominant cultural 
ethos is not that of the anomic state, but rather one of moral cynicism, defined herein 
as a lack of personal agency and responsibly on the part of the citizenry and 
interpersonal distrust.  As these measures, gleaned from aggregate responses to the 
World Values Survey, are not available for a number of the nations included in the prior 
analyses, a separate analysis was performed (N = 50). 
 Panel one of Table 9 provides the benchmark regression of the TI-CPI regressed 
on IAT structural indicators and appropriate controls.  Panel 2 includes the two cultural 
indicators as discussed in Chapter 4—moral cynicism and interpersonal distrust.   
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Table 9: Corruption perceptions (TI-CPI regressed on IAT structural and cultural indicators 
 
 Baseline model Culture 
Variable 
 
b β t b β t 
State dominance (-1/x) 7.08 .65 9.76** 5.80 .54 5.05** 
Industrialization -.76 -.31 -4.72** -.86 -.28 -3.50** 
Education .12 .05 1.08 .05 .02 .25 
Family disruption 
 
.01 .06 1.43 .02 .01 1.50 
Moral cynicism    .18 .05 .75 
Interpersonal distrust 
 
   3.85 .20 2.83** 
Population heterogeneity -.01 .00 -.06 .01 .01 .06 
Government size -.02 -.03 -.76 .00 .00 -.03 
Fmr. British colony -.45 -.08 -2.07** -.34 -.05 -.79 
Protestant -.21 -.04 -.80 -.45 -.07 -.84 
       
F-statistic (df) 82.1(8)** 34.4(10)** 
Adjusted R
2
 .86 .87 
Δ R
2
  .01** 
 N = 121 N = 50 
** p < 0.05     
At the model level, the inclusion of the two cultural indicators increases the model fit by 
one percentage point over the structural model; this increase is significant (F change = 
4.856, p < 0.05).  As in the bivariate analysis, moral cynicism is not significantly related 
to corruption perceptions in these data.  Interpersonal distrust does exhibit a moderate 
(β = 0.2) relationship with corruption perceptions, holding all other variables in the 
analysis constant.  For every one-point increase in the interpersonal distrust scale, there 
is a corresponding 3.85 increase in the TI-CPI.  This is consistent with the alternate 
reading of IAT, as well as with corruption research that has linked this dimension of 
social capital with corruption at the cross-national level (Uslaner, 2004).  Although 
Uslaner (2004) claims that the direction of causation is from social trust to corruption, 
there is a likelihood of a non-recursive relationship, or feedback loops, such that a lack 
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of social trust increases corruption, which than increases interpersonal distrust.  
Unfortunately, the cross-sectional nature of the current study precludes testing this 
hypothesis.  Finally, there is also a possibility of mediation and/or moderation of the 
institutional variables  by the inclusion of the social trust measures.  At this time, 
however; these possibilities have not been fully theorized. 
Regression diagnostics and sensitively analysis 
 The use of ordinary least-squares regression analysis requires that certain 
assumptions about the data be met.  According to Berry and Feldman (1985), “in the 
real world of research…one or more of these assumptions are likely to be violated…  
[This] may produce misleading or problematic coefficient estimates” (p. 7).  In the 
current study, several transformations of the data were performed in order to introduce 
linearity (transformation of the state dominance variable) and deal with a non-additive 
model specification (introduction of appropriate interaction terms). 
 In macro-level research studies, multicollinearity often poses problems amongst 
highly correlated theoretical constructs.  When multicollinearity is present, parameter 
estimates may be biased and unreliable, standard errors become inflated and Type-II 
errors become likely (Fox, 1991).  In the present study, several component variables 
were combined using principal-components analysis (PCA) in order to reduce the highly 
correlated dimensions into a single factor score.  Furthermore, in the creation of the 
interaction terms for the moderation models, variables were mean-centered prior to 
estimation as per convention (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990).  Although at the 
bivariate level, state dominance and industrialization were highly correlated (r = -0.72), 
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an examination of the variance inflation factors (VIF) indicated that none reached the 
“rule of thumb” threshold of VIF > 4, with the highest VIF equaling 3.7 for the state-
dominance measure in the mediation (full-structural) model (Fox, 1991)6.  Finally, both 
the state dominance and industrialization measure reaches statistical significance in 
each of the models tested, thus, it appears that the data are free from serious 
collinearity. 
 Examination of the dependent and independent variable residuals did not 
indicate heterogeneity in the error variance, another issue often prevalent in macro-
level research.  Although one of the variables, moral cynicism, did appear to exhibit a 
heteroskedastic “fan shape,” White’s test (1980) failed to confirm non-constant error 
variance in this measure.  Spatial autocorrelation was also not problematic in the 
present data, as the Durbin-Watson statistic for each of the models estimated 
approximately two. 
 A final test of the regression assumptions indicated the presence of two 
influential outliers in the data.  Both the Czech Republic and Nigeria produced Cook’s 
distance values greater than one.  An examination of the DFbeta scores for the 
individual independent variable showed that these two nations were outliers on the 
state dominance, education, family disruption, moral cynicism, and interpersonal 
                                                 
6
  The state-dominance variance-inflation factor did reach 4.76 in moderation model 1, which 
includes the state dominance-industrialization interaction.  Furthermore, that interaction product term 
had a VIF of 12.50.  This is unavoidable to the inherent perfect correlation of the state-dominance 
component variable and the high correlation between state dominance and industrialization in the 
bivariate findings.  Both reach statistical significant in the model, indicating that high collinearity is not 
problematic, although the exact coefficients should be interpreted with caution. 
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distrust measures.  Additionally Nigeria was an outlier on industrialization, population 
heterogeneity, and government size indicators.  To test the sensitivity of the models 
indicated in the present study, each was rerun with Nigeria and the Czech Republic 
variable removed.   
Regression analysis with these outlier nations removed showed no substantive 
difference in either the cultural or two of the moderation models.  However, in the 
mediation (full socio-structural IAT model), the omission of the Czech Republic and 
Nigeria increases the model fit, such that the model explains 90% of the variation in 
corruption perceptions cross-nationally.  Additionally, in the revised mediation model 
the education measure reaches statistical significance (b = .54), p < 0.05), although this 
effect is weak (β = .15) and not in the expected direction.  Moderation model one (state-
industrialization interaction) and moderation model three (state-family disruption 
interaction) are substantively unchanged, however; in moderation model two (state-
education interaction) the algebraic direction of the state-education interaction 
reverses direction (b = -0.57), but the effect size is weak and fails to reach statistical 
significance (β = -.09, p > 0.05).  This finding indicates that IAT is not only sensitive to the 
measures included in analysis (Piquero and Piquero, 1998), but also the nations included 
in analysis as first suggested by Trent (2007).  As this is the first study of this alternate 
configuration of the institutional balance of power, as well as the first study to include 
over 100 nations at varying stages of development, further research is warranted. 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to test the efficacy of an alternate configuration of 
Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional-anomie theory.  Prior research has supported of 
IAT at the cross-national level (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000), when 
the “institutional balance of power” is tipped so that the economy dominates over non-
economic institutions, which, in turn, lose their ability to exert normative controls over a 
populace (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2006, p. 130-131).  Support for IAT has also been 
found sub-nationally at various levels of aggregation (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; 
Maume and Lee, 2003; Piquero and Piquero, 1998).  All but one empirical test of IAT has 
focused on street crime (see Schoepfer and Piquero, 2006, for an analysis of white-collar 
crimes across a United States sub-national sample); the current study expands upon this 
small body of literature to include other institutional configurations, while focusing on 
less-studied crimes of power. 
According to Messner and Rosenfeld, it is not merely economic dominance that 
may be responsible for high crime rate, but rather, “institutional imbalance per se” 
(2001, p. 155, emphasis in original).  The authors describe other, analytically distinct 
configurations of institutional imbalance that predict different types of crime.  One of 
these, a dominant state, is hypothesized to be related to high levels of corruption within 
a social collective (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001; 2004; Rosenfeld, 2004).  This study is 
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the first to test this alternate configuration across a relatively large sample of nations at 
varying levels of development.  Additionally, this study provides a complete test of this 
alternate configuration of IAT by developing an operationalization and measure for 
“moral cynicism”, the cultural condition that Messner and Rosenfeld posit as the 
cultural condition caused when “the state assumes and ever expanding role in 
regulating everyday life” (2001, p. 155).  To date, few empirical tests of IAT have 
included measures of culture dynamics, an integral facet of IAT, and with limited 
support (Cao, 2004; Chamlin and Cochran, 1997; 2007; Cullen, Parboteeah, and Hoegl, 
2004; Jensen, 2002; Muftic, 2006).   
The current study confirms Messner and Rosenfeld’s alternate configuration of 
the institutional balance of power.  As hypothesized, the level of state dominance 
(defined and measured as the absence of popular control over the state), is positively 
related to corruption cross-nationally, with the highest levels of state dominance 
clustered in several African and post-Soviet nations, countries which also rank high on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI).  As suggested by the 
literature (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004), a curvilinear relationship was 
found between state dominance and corruption, one that takes a cubic functional form.  
In order to introduce linearity to the state dominance-corruption relationship, the 
negative inverse (-1/x) of state dominance was used in the multivariate regression 
models.  The direct effects of state dominance on corruption, controlling for known 
correlates of corruption was very strong, explaining 80% of the variation in corruption 
across the nations included in the sample. 
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According to Messner and Rosenfeld, social institutions are to some degree 
interdependent and coordinated.  It is hypothesized that the non-polity institutions will 
mediate and/or moderate the corruption-prone tendencies of the dominant state.  In 
order to test for mediation, the non-polity variables (economy (industrialization), 
education, and family disruption) were added to the baseline model.  The addition of 
these variables increased the coefficient of determination for the model to 86%.  One of 
the non-polity variables, industrialization (proxy for economic strength), was negatively 
related to corruption cross-nationally, and, additionally, attenuated the corruption-
producing effects of the dominant state.  This finding is consistent with Maume and 
Lee’s mediation hypothesis (2003), as well as Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) argument 
that the economy acts as an institution of normative control.  The other institutions 
described in IAT (education and family disruption) failed to relate significantly to 
corruption at the cross-national level, consistent with bivariate findings in the present 
study. 
A second possible causal link—moderation, was tested through the introduction 
of interaction terms.  The state dominance-industrialization interaction was significantly 
related to corruption cross-nationally indicating that a non-additive model was 
appropriate.  In other words, the effect of state domination on corruption is dependent 
upon levels of industrialization.  Higher levels of industrialization actually increases 
corruption when the level of state dominance is high.  While this may appear to 
contradict the earlier mediation finding, this is consistent with prior research on 
corruption in dictatorships and rentier state theory, and it indicates that the mediation 
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and moderation arguments are not mutually exclusive. 
Finally, unlike many prior tests of IAT, the present study included two measures 
of cultural conditions gleaned from the World Values Survey—moral cynicism and 
interpersonal distrust.  While the former (measured as a factor score of volunteerism 
and personal responsibility and agency) was unrelated to corruption at the cross-
national level, interpersonal distrust was positively related to corruption.  Although the 
magnitude of this relationship appears weak (β = 0.2), this measure did reach 
significance in a smaller sub-sample of nations (N = 50), or under less than ideal 
circumstances.  This finding is consistent with the small body of literature linking social 
trust (or social capital (see Putnam, 2000)) with lowers instances of corrupt activities 
(Bjornskov, 2004; Uslaner, 2004; Zak and Knack, 2001).  This may be an indirect link, as it 
is hypothesized that “trusting societies” are more likely to have more efficient 
bureaucracies and higher levels of development, both correlates of reduced corruption 
(Harris, 2007, p. 2).  The inverse has also been supported, suggesting that societies with 
high levels of social capital may also be characterized by clientelism or familism, which 
reduces the ability for in-group members to cooperate with outsiders (Harris, 2007; 
Lipset and Lenz, 1999).  The positive association between distrust and corruption in the 
current study warrants further investigation. 
Regression diagnostics identified two nations who proved to be outliers on 
nearly every independent variable—Nigeria and the Czech Republic.  The removal of 
these two nations increased the fit of the mediation model, such that the coefficient of 
determination reached 90%.  Furthermore, this change caused the direct effects of 
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education to become significantly, positively related to corruption, an unexpected 
finding.  Limited research suggests that corruption nations will have lower levels of 
education, as resources are diverted and distorted, benefitting political organizations 
rather than the populace (Mauro, 1997).  Although higher levels of education have been 
found to increase white-collar criminal behaviors, the inverse has been found when 
dealing with street crimes (Schoepfer and Piquero, 2006).  This seemingly incongruent 
findings warrants further investigation as the effects of education on corruption levels 
cross-nationally has largely been ignored.   
Additionally, as the presence of only two outliers significantly impacts the 
results, future research should continue to examine the applicability of IAT to a such 
large array of nations.  As found by Chamlin and Cochran (2007) and echoed in Trent 
(2007), the efficacy of IAT seems to be dependent upon the levels of development of 
the nations included in the analysis.  When state dominance is plotted against 
corruption (see Chapter 4), it appears that only a few highly industrialized, generally 
core OECD nations appear in the low-corruption, low-state dominance range.  Similarly, 
only a handful of nations are high-corruption, high state dominance, and most are 
politically unstable, low development, peripheral nations.  Replication of the current 
study, sampling from these “extremes” may provide more interesting results as to the 
role that that various characteristics of the state may play in these cases.  IAT alone may 
not be able to explain these findings, suggesting integration with other theories, such as 
dependency and world systems, quantifiable through political economy measures 
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(Wallerstein, 1974)7 
Limitations 
Several limitations exist in the current study, each providing avenues for future 
research.  At the macro-level, direct measures of theoretical constructs are unavailable.  
Proxy variables must be used.  The current study used a factor score that measured a 
nation’s level of industrialization as a proxy for the strength of the economy within a 
collective.  This measure strayed from the standard measures of economy found in 
macro-level analysis—relative or absolute deprivation, as the common variables 
representing these constructs (GINI coefficient and poverty levels, respectively) present 
problems with endogeneity and causal order.  Prior research suggests that these 
measures are both a cause and consequence of corruption (see Lambsdorff, 1999).   
Following Cullen et. al. (2004) who draw on Bonger (1969), the current study 
operationalized the strength of the economy as levels of industrialization, yet, in the 
globalized world,  the relevance of this measure may be called into question.  Many 
industrialized nations, including the United States, have moved from production to 
service economies as globalization shrinks our world.  Research suggests that the advent 
of large multi-national conglomerates actually leads to competition that promotes 
corruption in developing nations (Goudie and Stasavage 1998, p. 119), while Sajó (2003) 
puts forth globalization as an explanation of recent increases in corruption cross-
nationally, especially instances of grand corruption.  Future research should address 
measures that tap into the globalized economy.  These may include measures of 
                                                 
7
  The author would like to thank Michael Lynch for pointing out this interesting link. 
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transnational trade, labor migration, capital investment, and technology, using indices 
such as the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006).  Still, the interesting results of the 
current study, such that industrialization acts as both a mediator and a moderator to the 
corruption-prone effects of state dominance, should not be discarded.  Rather, further 
research should build upon this foundation when determining how to best measure the 
economy both within and outside the IAT framework. 
Future studies of IAT must continue to find applicable measures for the other 
social institutions described in Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory.  In particular, the family 
disruption measure, usually captured as the ratio of marriages to divorces, is unavailable 
for a large number of nations, thus the effects of divorce on corruption remains 
unknown.  The current study used a measure of female economic activity to capture 
family disruption, but this measure was not related to corruption rates.  In the absence 
of other measures, we cannot determine what role, if any, the family institutions plays 
in the study of corruption.  Unfortunately, due to barriers such as cost, feasibility, and 
efficiency, researches are often limited to the use of secondary data not systematically 
collected to specifically test theory.  Lacking direct and sound cross-national measures, 
the effects of this and other institutions such as religion will remain largely hypothetical.  
Furthermore, the unavailability of sound measures precluded testing this configuration 
of IAT against any rival theories at this time.  Only as macro-level measures become 
more developed and refined, will critical theory testing become possible at the cross-
national level. 
Finally, the use of a cross-sectional dataset limits the current findings to 
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correlates, rather than causes of corruption.  It is common practice to use multi-year 
averages to control for economic and political fluctuations, however; in order to 
disentangle causal order, it is imperative to test theories cross-nationally using 
longitudinal, time-series data.  Examination of nations over time would also better assist 
in determining if the non-political institutions mediate or moderate the corruption-
prone effects of state dominance by examining the effects of these institutions 
consecutively at equal intervals and identifying turning points.  Future research should 
begin to use longitudinal data as this becomes available.   
Finally, it is troublesome that the moralistic approach to the study of corruption 
that emerged in the 1990’s has been used to promote anti-corruption legislation and 
agenda, rather than comprehension of the phenomenon (Kotkin and Sajó, 2002).  It is 
imperative that we first begin to understand corruption, a behavior that lacks even a 
definitional consensus, before we use empirical findings to inform public policy.  Simply 
put, at this time, not enough is known. 
Conclusion 
In sum, in the twelve years since the publication of Crime and the American 
Dream, researchers have found institutional-anomie theory to provide a sophisticated 
expansion of the Mertonian tradition of anomie theory as a possible explanation of the 
variance in crime rates across various macro-social units of analysis, but the authors do 
not limit their theory to instrumental crime, nor to cultural conditions of anomie.  As 
shown in the current study, alternate specifications of the theory show empirical 
promise in predicting other forms of crime, or crime- equivalents, under other cultural 
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conditions.  At present, too little has been done in both furthering theories of the 
anomie paradigm, and in studying other forms of crime and deviance beyond 
conventional street crime.  Further research will assist in better specifying IAT’s 
theoretical and causal assumptions, and, if sustained, institutional-anomie theory may 
provide guidance to instruct public policies and the allocation of national assets in 
combating not only crime, conventionally defined, but also a wide range of serious 
offenses. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
Corruption perceptions 1 to 10 scale (Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of perceived corruption); 2001-2005 avg. 
(annual) 
Transparency International  
Corruption Perceptions Index 
 www.ti.org 
Moral cynicism 
     Cynical orientation 
Voluntary organization mean and government 
responsibility factor score; 2000 
World Values Survey-International Network of 
Social Scientists 
World Values Survey (2000) 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
    Interpersonal distrust Social trust measure; 2000 World Values Survey-International Network of 
Social Scientists 
World Values Survey (2000) 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
State dominance 
     Voice and accountability 
Extent to which citizens may participate in 
government, freedom of speech/association; 
2000-2005 avg. (annual) 
World Bank Group 
Governance Indicators 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
     Regulatory quality Regulations that promote and permit private 
sector development; 2000-2005 avg. (annual) 
World Bank Group 
Governance Indicators 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
     Rule of law Quality and predictability of law enforcement 
and judiciary, extent to which agents have 
confidence in rules of society ; 2000-2005 avg. 
(annual) 
World Bank Group 
Governance Indicators 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
     Civil liberties and political rights Freedom of expression, associational and 
organizational rights, personal autonomy; 
electoral process, political pluralism, 2000 
Freedom House 
Freedom Around the World, 2005 
www.freedomhouse.org 
     Freedom of the press Legal environment, political pressures, 
economic factors, access to information; 2004 
Freedom House 
Freedom Around the World, 2005 
www.freedomhouse.org 
     Dimensions of democracy (Vanhanen) Competition (% of seats held by dominant 
party) and electoral turnout; 1810-1998 
T. Vanhanen (2000) 
“A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-
1998”  
Journal of Peace Research, 37(2), 251-265 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES (cont.) 
 State dominance (cont.) 
     Regime type 
Monarchic dictatorship, military dictatorship, 
civilian dictatorship, presidential democracy, 
mixed democracy, parliamentary democracy; 
2000 
J.A. Cheibub. & J. Gandhi, J. (2004).  
“A six-fold classification of democracies and 
dictatorships” 
 Paper presented the 2004 meeting of American 
Political Science Association. 
Industrialization factor score 
     GDP per capita (PPP) 
Final value of goods and services within a nation 
adjusted for cost of living and inflation; 2000-
2005 avg. (semi-annual) 
World Bank Group 
World Development Indicators, 2007 
www.worldbank.org 
     Commercial energy use Oil equivalent per capita; 2002-2005 avg. (semi-
annual) 
World Bank Group 
World Development Indicators, 2007 
www.worldbank.org  
     Electrical consumption Per capita in kilowatt-hours; 2001 United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2003 
www.undp.org 
     Urban population Population living in urban areas (defined by 
within-nation census data) as % of total pop.; 
2002-2005 avg. (annual) 
World Bank Group 
World Development Indicators 2007 
www.worldbank.org  
     Distribution by sector Economic distribution by sector; percent non-
agrarian (combined industry and service); 
various years 
United States Central Intelligence Agency 
CIA World Factbook, 2007 
https://www.cia.gov/library 
Family disruption Female economic activity (non-domestic labor) 
rate (% ages 15 and above); 2002 
United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2003 
www.undp.org 
Education factor 
     Enrollment 
Combined gross enrollment (primary, 
secondary, and tertiary schools); 2001-2004 
avg. (annual) 
United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2003;2007 
www.undp.org 
     Literacy rate Adult literacy rate (ages 15 and above); 2000-
2002 (annual) 
United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2003 
www.undp.org 
  
145 
 
APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES (cont.) 
Control variables 
     Population heterogeneity 
          Economic disparity 
Gini index of income equality; 2004 United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2004 
www.undp.org 
          Ethno-linguistic fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization (combined linguistic and 
racial); 2002 
A. Alesina et. al (2002) 
“Fractionalization” 
Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 155-194 
         Former British colony Dichotomous variable (0= no; 1 = yes) United States Central Intelligence Agency 
CIA World Factbook, 2007 
https://www.cia.gov/library 
         Protestant Dichotomous variable (0=no; 1= yes) United States Central Intelligence Agency 
CIA World Factbook, 2007 
https://www.cia.gov/library 
         Size of government Central government expenditures (as % of GDP); 
2000-2005 mean value (annual) 
World Bank Group 
World Development Indicators, 2007 
www.worldbank.org 
 
 
